Originally Posted by
Lonewolf50
That is no excuse for writing an ops or a training manual that doesn't educate as well as train. You have to know how your system works to operate it professionally.
I have lost count how many times I've quoted preamble of Airbus manuals on PPRuNe; they are not intended to teach basic flying concepts. Pilot who is training on Airbus will easily relate what is written with what he experienced in sim or aeroplane. PPRuNer who has no idea about basic instrument flying, airline training and operations, after reading FCOM usually finds excuses to let his imagination run wild, resulting in spectacularly flawed and somewhat hilarious theories on how Airbus FBW works.
Originally Posted by
Lonewolf50
You are carrying the trusting public in your aluminum tubes with wings.
So? Unlike PPRuNers disconcerted with Airbus flight system architecture, extreme majority Airbus pilots do understand and operate their machines correctly. If all the BS about Airbus FBW written here were true, there wold be no need for BSers to flog dead AF447 horse as there would be dozens of fresh accidents to pontificate about.
Originally Posted by
Lonewolf50
Since we are discussing AF 447, we may wish to remember that in this case airspeed indications had gone on holiday thanks to a voting procedure. (And some ice in the tubes). Granted, that eventually resolved itself but by then the crew were behind the aircraft.
There is no voting procedure for speed displays. Vsw is displayed in ALT2. By the time of continuous stall warning, ADR1 was measuring correct speed for about 14 seconds. By the apogee, pitot3 was unblocked too.
It's a moot point anyway, stall warning and buffeting were very well present.
Originally Posted by
Lonewolf50
So what does explain that, in your humble opinion?
It's self explanatory for anyone who has a slightest clue about flying but I guess I have to bring it down to level understandable to average PPRuNer: if one is below desired altitude, one has to climb to it. If one is above desired altitude, one has to descend to it.
Originally Posted by
roulishollandais
The result is dummy pilots who no more understand their planes and are unable to understand them.
So either the dummyness of pilots who no more understand their aeroplanes is bringing total number of fatal accidents (despite increasing number of flights) every year to record low or your comment is totally ignorant and somewhat offensive.
Originally Posted by alf5071h
It is impossible to gain a full understanding of what the aircraft is doing from a small set of two or three lights.
Report has made it pretty clear that left to her own devices, F-GZCP would have done nothing significant.
Originally Posted by vilas
Below is the link to SAFO on stall recovery. Actual accidents you will have to google.
No search engine can change the fact there was none as described in US.
Issue with approach to stall recovery that emphasizes minimum altitude loss is not that it's wrong (it isn't) but that it is too narrow in scope. It does not prepare one for high altitude event, full stall, or low altitude event with mistrimmed stabilizer. So my type now has universal procedure that lays burden on the pilot; thrust - as required, trim - as required. Better be sure you make it right first time.
Originally Posted by seagull967
This crew never knew they stalled.
Exactly. Despite forcing aeroplane to climb at RoC and pitch dangerously unsuitable for cruise. Despite climbing high above optimum and maximum altitude. Despite losing control of the aeroplane. Despite warning systems shouting "STALL STALL" at them.
Originally Posted by seagull967
I somewhat agree with you, but I think that if you saw an AoA guage with a CLEARLY defined "red zone" and you are in it, with proper training, a pilot might just do the right thing.
Say, what was the right thing done that enabled other 36 crews to survive UAS in 330/340s? They didn't have AoA gauges.
Originally Posted by vilas
AF447 pilots at that point of time did not have the training and technique to deal with the situation.
Maybe it would be useful to define "situation".
Originally Posted by vilas
They put the aircraft beyond extremes of flight envelope. You cannot have training solutions to recover from that.
So, avoid 'em.
Originally Posted by vilas
The main point of training must be that in Airbus alternate law never grab the stick and apply pitch inputs.
True but TAM A330 incident on 12 11 2003, described on the page 87 of final report proves that even extreme ham fistedness, on A330, flying at cruise level in alternate law is not necessarily lethal.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
It is below the normal 1g for 25 sec prior the stall entry and it is nearly consecutive 60 sec below 1 g after the stall enty. Even when pulling the loadfactor was below 1 g. The human body is unfamiliar and very succeptable to reduced g loading, and it is not known to be accompanied by stall. Without physical training expierience of such a situation, with unreliable airspeed, no AOA and no loadfactor indication, how should they have been fully aware of their situation?
For Finnegan's sake, it reaches 1.5 g in initial pullup, gets to +0.6 G minimum and then mushes between +0.75 and + 1.25 G for the rest of the flight. It's nothing unusual even for airliner!
Originally Posted by Goldenrivett
I agree. But how do you detect it early if you don't have active side stick controls fitted?
Like this:
Lufthansa A320 incident at Frankfurt. Questions?
Originally Posted by vilas
In AF447 they were flying without looking at PFD for most part and that I find very strange.
No! Both pilots verbalized loss of airspeed indication and CM2 kept roll very well under control so he must have been looking at PFD.