Although you are right for this case in following PJ2' s early recomendation to do nothing, the conclusion that training in high altitude manual handling and stall avoidance or recovery training for such events is not necessary is premature.
AF 447 could have dropped into direct law as any aircraft in the future could do as well where control in all three axis has to be applied immidiately. Another day, another situation, anouher fault and we go again.
A pilot has to be trained to be able to grab the stick and maintain the necessary attitude througout the complete flight envelope and be able to recover from situations, when this flightenvelope is exceeded by whatever cause it may be.
In the video Confiture posted just some posts before, watch the loadfactor. It is below the normal 1g for 25 sec prior the stall entry and it is nearly consecutive 60 sec below 1 g after the stall enty. Even when pulling the loadfactor was below 1 g. The human body is unfamiliar and very succeptable to reduced g loading, and it is not known to be accompanied by stall. Without physical training expierience of such a situation, with unreliable airspeed, no AOA and no loadfactor indication, how should they have been fully aware of their situation? We are talking in hindsight here, we have analysed and studied all available material, have looked at the FDR second by second, studied books and all available sources and have now a totally different knowledge base then they had during that night.
We know that they did not react to the stall like they should have, but besides the possibility that they were not able to identify in being in a stall they may have reacted on their knowledge base, but didn't know how much nose down stick input was required, how long it was required and how 0 g really feel. "I have no control......" were Bonins words.