I think we all appreciate there isn't, and can't be, a one size fits all policy. That is one of the main reasons why certain key staffs are required to exercise engineering judgement. I happen to agree with this policy. What I don't agree with is the practice whereby staffs with no engineering background whatsoever are permitted to self delegate and overrule properly formulated decisions, or make engineering decisions that are manifestly unsafe.
The other key aspect is if you study the accidents we discuss here, Chinook ZD576, Nimrod XV230, Hercules XV179, Tornado ZG710 and so on, in all cases simply following the regulations would in all probability have prevented the accident (by eliminating events and factors that led to cause) and that in most cases this would have been cheaper and quicker. None of these aircraft satisfied the design and airworthiness regulations (which are all about safety).
As an example, one time I was faced with such an overrule, on an IFF system, the project office responsible flatly refused to integrate Mode 4 failure warnings (the same primary factor that caused ZG710 to be shot down). This saved them the princely sum of SFA. All they had to do was refuse to pay up and the contractor would have had to do his job properly, which would have taken less time as they actually had to amend the design pack to ensure it was non-compliant!! Aircrew on detachment to Boscombe Down pleaded for the regs to be implemented and were ignored. When the aircraft was delivered to me (to conduct a mid life upgrade) it cost me £4M to do this work - and of course that doesn't count the modification work on the Fleet and the impact on Operational Effectiveness. As the money had already been spent (on nothing) the rules (quite rightly) said I could not be given any more, so as well as time and money being lost, some capability had to be sliced out of the aircraft spec. Both Director General Air Systems 2 (the Nimrod MRA4 and Chinook HC Mk3 2 Star) and the Chief of Defence Procurement specifically ruled all this was acceptable, and that the IFF project office had been correct to knowingly pay for, accept and deliver a functionally unsafe aircraft (which is to commit fraud). And the RN could swivel if they didn't like it. And swivel they did. And the RAF did nothing, despite a recommendation that they check their own IFF failure warning integration, hence ZG710 was unsafe on 22.3.03.
As ever, the MAA are aware and support these decisions.
The herd of elephants I talk about!