The "Interviews' Document" is particularly telling - there is a huge amount of detail on the practices and the loading of the accident flight - number of chains/straps/palettes etc.
Seems to me that the "You call, we haul" philosophy of the company may well have had something to do with this accident and the flight load master was put in a difficult and unprecedented position: the 3X18 ton MRAP Cougars were behemoths and together with the lighter 12 ton MRAPS, an unfamiliar/exceptional payload, which had to be loaded & attached in improvised fashion with no particular guidance.
The double pallet system, used on this occasion and many others, by the company was too large to be attached to the floor and was therefore 'floating' with only strapping to the aircraft. A National Air Cargo loader (who previously worked for DHL) and who helped load the flight said:
The Cougars were 18 tons, and this was the first time they had ever loaded something that large. There were no floor locks used on the MRAPs since the pallets were center loaded.
All 5 MRAPs were loaded in a central line, with at least one lighter 12 ton MRAP in front of the 3 Cougars. (Note, there is a discrepancy in one of the interviews, with the same loader implying both lighter MRAPs were at the front and then later saying one was fore and one aft. The aft MRAP was:
just beyond the aft cargo door
. The loaders also mention a final smaller pallet in the T2 position with only a light scaffolding load, but which was actually secured to the floor by 'bear claws'.
The Principal Operations Inspector (POI) for National Airlines said he was aware the
FAA was currently conducting enforcement proceedings against National, primarily because they had 5 MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicles on the main deck, using tie downs on seat tracks, which could have exceeded seat track limits. He also had an issue with the manuals and if they were complete or not
The company seem to have acknowledged all this with a current moratorium on 'floating' pallets (i.e. unsecured to the floor) until the manual is updated, a specialist team to advise on exceptionally heavy loads, plus support for load masters who wish to refuse a load.
One person saw fluid leaking from the tail of the aircraft. Sweepers found some debris near the runway characterised as “metal” but it doesn't seem certain they were 100% certain it was from the accident flight.