This is a fascinating psychological topic. The general consensus in the literature is that pilots revert to a primitive concept that equates flying with climbing. This makes sense in that in order to fly one must climb up from the ground. What do you do when you want to fly? You go up. Mentally, the pilot goes back to square one and tries to take off all over again. In the AF447 case it was revealed that all the way into the sea the pilots kept trying to get the plane to /climb/ and even verbalized that intent. When in fact is they have just flown the plane they would have been OK.
What still remains to be understood is why some pilots revert to an incorrect cognitive map under stress. Is it that they were poorly trained to begin with? Or perhaps they have some basic psychological predisposition?
The physical, electronic and environmental problems encountered by a crew can occasionally be very difficult. Almost always, a good outcome is determined by the actions of the crew. Psychology cannot be ignored when reviewing why an accident occurred or was prevented, and I am very pleased that this has been raised.
This A320 accident seems related to conditioning and acceptance of known problems, i.e. FAC and weather. No-one was going to rock the boat. Right there is the psychology link.
We are conditioned to avoid severe weather either by flying around it or choice of a flight path through an area less affected.
When there is real difficulty with either of these two options on line-up with a take-off clearance, a slot time and a line of aircraft on finals, a significant number of crews will avoid the torturous prospect of taxiing to an exit to join a long queue again for the next take-off opportunity.
When the real difficulty is en-route, return to departure airfield or diversion to an airfield that may have reduced handling capacity is less likely to be in the DNA of a crew.
When the real weather difficulty is at destination, I believe almost all crews are conditioned for holding or proceeding to an alternate, though some require the prompting of ATC to avoid a hazardous situation.
How do crews press on in situations where appropriate vigilance would dictate more prudent decisions? Common to all three scenarios is disruption to schedule, increased airline costs, insufficient fuel for the particular circumstances and insufficient duty time remaining.
TAKE-OFF:
Miss slot time
Cause missed approaches
Written report required when other company aircraft accept take-off
ENROUTE:
Psychologically conditioned to continue to destination
Embarrassed to return or divert when other company aircraft continue
Never operated to potential diversion airfields and perhaps insufficient knowledge about ground handling and refuelling facilities
Diversion airfield is in another country
DESTINATION:
Other aircraft are landing without any reports of problems
ATC has not closed airfield
Did not previously consider diverting to alternate, updated forecast and TAF not requested. Maybe the alternate weather is the same?
A task for the vigilant crew is to identify and minimise risk, while attempting to operate aircraft efficiently. Good abilities, knowledge of aircraft and procedures is assumed. Here are some examples of other ways to minimise risk:
Know flight and duty time available before departure. Don't automatically consider that your company has taken this into account
Consider fuel and carry more than the flight plan minimum if prudent.
Depart a few minutes early whenever possible. Helps with duty time, slot times and might enable an early or on-time arrival
Get a print-out of forecast and TAF / METAR for all possible diversion airfields at flight planning stage. Do this again via ACARS enroute
Have ready information re diversion airfield minimas, facilities, grid MORA and 25 NM safety altitudes. Make your own map with this info for common routes if company allows. Of course keep it updated.
Depending on planned LW, save a little fuel enroute by direct tracking and good choice of flight level
Figure out the best way to get a good slot and keep it. Avoiding a 1 hour delay helps reduce the pressure to press on.
There are sure to be some experienced crews who give proper consideration to many of my points. From my own many critical observations there are many who will allow their options for safer flight to just slip away without really knowing that it is happening. I am not being ultra precious about psychology. Insufficient thought processes cause fatal events.
I have remained amazed at AF, BA and other major airlines landing at BKK in a severe TS with very heavy rain, strong and variable gusty wind with driving rain. Nobody wanted to take-off, but landing was OK??? At the time BKK tower did not have the authority to close the airfield for adverse weather. The only reasonable conclusion I could draw was that these major operators didn't know this and trusted the open status of the airfield to indicate that conditions were safe when they clearly were not. I have tried to figure out the mental processes that allow such risky behaviour.