Lonewolf, PJ2, obviously we have similar views, but within this agreement, some differences.
PJ, considering your ‘assumption’ in a wider context, then there is an inference that the ‘average skills’ within the overall flying process will ‘always’ be used at the appropriate time; i.e. both having and knowing which skills to use, and when.
However, this point might be refuted in the differences between previous events and AF447.
All crews encountered adverse conditions; some initially reacted as AF447, but at a later point transitioned to a successful outcome. Why; what attributes, skills, behaviour, etc, led them to revert to appropriate actions whereas AF447 did not.
As far as is known all crews had ‘identical’ (acceptable) ‘average ability’ based on training, checking, normal operations, etc (but I am prepared to debate that). Thus the key issue is the ability to switch between alternative courses of action, which in turn involves awareness / understanding, knowledge of procedures, and ability to recall them (including cognitive resource).
The latter point includes surprise which appears to dominate in AF447 and other LoC events; thus how do crews use their skills when subject to surprise?
This line of argument can be applied to other ice crystal (non) events in A330s. We do not know how many other crews have been confronted by ice crystal conditions, but either due to less severe weather or appropriate change of track, they did not suffer an adverse event. Again what led crews to take these courses of action. It appears that this involves similar qualities of ‘skill’ (judgement) within the overall flying process as required in the incidents, but were used at an earlier time. Thus key issues are when to change the course of action and what mental abilities are required to understand the situation and choose the correct action.
The above concentrates on mental skills with all the problems of influences, bias, training, knowledge, and constraints of human factors.
Outwardly this involves TEM and Time; Avoid (detect and react a threat), Detect and react to an error (revise the course of action), Mitigate (recover), before the situation degenerates to an accident – the importance of timely thoughts.
… does the above challenge the assumption that average crews have sufficient skill for all reasonable situations (what is reasonable); if not then how are these aspects to be taught, checked, practiced, and then how can we ensure that they will be used.
The alternative is to minimize the occasions where crews are exposed to adverse situations.
Neither is a perfect solution, and there may not be one, because the variable human is involved; could there be a compromise, and if so what (assuming that this form of safety activity is required).