Beginning on 1 June 2009, when 229 souls perished in the Atlantic crossing the ITCZ, in a thunderstorm, punching a cell, crossing extreme shear layers and entering 100+ mph
updrafts combined with warm air, followed by 100+ mph downdrafts of cold air and icing conditions -- the anvil portion of the cloud being even more extreme -- weather effects upon AB software have been discussed and re-discussed and recommendations made.
In December of 2014, 168 souls perished in the Java Sea crossing the ITCZ, in a thunderstorm, punching a cell, crossing extreme shear layers and entering 100+ mph
updrafts combined with warm air, followed by 100+ mph downdrafts of cold air and icing conditions -- the anvil portion of the cloud being even more extreme....
Both occurring while a FBW system reacts to such insults by trimming the THS to full nose up, and commanding its pilots to follow a flight director that indicates further full nose up, leading to these zoom climbs (The FAC's panicked response to perceived overspeed due to lack of speeds from the pitots and over-reliance on merely the pitots to determine speed.)
I remember being transfixed by the loss of AF447 and following most every thread since then with great interest.
WHENEVER YOU ARE SURPRISED THE MOST IMPORTANT MEMORY ITEM IS:
AUTOPILOT OFF
AUTO THRUST OFF
FLIGHT DIRECTORS OFF
IF AIRSPEED IS UNKNOWN, SET 90% N1
I remember posting back in 2009 on another forum that, at minimum, AB's should have a way of reverting back to manual, 'pilot mode' by providing its pilots with as much information (AoA display being one of them) as possible and providing the pilot with full, cable-and-lever, type control.
After another 168 lives lost, it is time to demand revision to the software. Revisions that gives the pilot back full control of a fully re-trimmed, completely flyable aircraft. I'd suggested back in 2009 that instead of dumping the the aircraft upon the pilots in an out of shape, out of control, "I give up" fashion, that:
The AIRCRAFT in the seconds during transition between AP to manual control, should instead:
1. Re-trim the THS to neutral
2. Re-trim the elevators and ailerons to neutral
3. Rapidly transfer fuel forward to achieve a more forward CG to improve flyability
4. Depending upon the altitude of the craft, and similar to the "exponential rates" and "dual rates" familiar to most radio control flight enthusiasts, give the pilot a dumbed down, not as twitchy/touchy and difficult to fly aircraft when at cruise altitudes, yet still able to provide plane-bending 100% deflections if necessary when control is completely handed to the pilot
and then
5. AUTOPILOT OFF
6. AUTO THRUST OFF
7. FLIGHT DIRECTORS OFF
8. IF AIRSPEED IS UNKNOWN, SET 90% N1
The big red button ought to do all of these things and HAL should press the button himself when unreliable airspeed/AoA sensors or otherwise promote AP auto-disconnect at cruise altitude.
(It would also seem that Airbus now has at least two sets of pretty good data on entry to stall, stall behavior, transition to deep stall, flat spin, 10,000+ per minute altitude loss.... to add to their simulator's knowledge base.)