Airbus design philosophy "keep the pilot in the dark".
Disclaimer, I fly Airbus so don't call me a Boeing troll.
How does a whole family of aircraft (Airbus FBW) get certified when through Air Asia, Air France, Lufthansa and the many other reports of, at the least UAS show a major design flaw still not corrected.
Ie where a simple disagreement between similar sensors (AOA, Pitots/ADRs), followed by computer rejection of perhaps the one accurate sensor, may then cause the computers to initiate drastic action on the flight controls requiring IMMEDIATE and correct response by the pilot whilst assessing what is valid and what isn't, with spurious ECAMS, Aural Alerts and displays, be allowed to be certified safe.
All, without letting the pilot know in the first instance of a disagreement between sensors and then the decision by the computer to reject a specific sensor, giving the pilot no indication anything is abnormal until all hell breaks loose?
To me this borders on the criminal, at the very least an immediate ECAM advising a specific sensor has been rejected, or even better is approaching the limits of rejections similar to "IRS excessive drift etc", would at least advise the pilot that something is amiss and the computers maybe about to take drastic action..