Ehem,
I'm the author (there's just one of me) of the work quoted by GoldenRivett above, and I'll clarify that the quoted conclusion relates strictly to the mechanisms that are used to resolve dual input scenarios. On that function there is IMO sufficient evidence in the form of ATSB and NTSB reports to indicate that it is a less than effective implementation, for the reasons stated. I'd note that at the time I wrote it I hadn't seen the AF447 final report, which is why it's not referenced, again in that incident we see the same behaviour.
By resolve 'control contention' DozyWannnabe I mean the PF knows the PNF has his hands on the controls and can either tell him to get his hands off or relinquish control. Dozy you're reading more into it that statement than there is, but that's probably because of how I worded it (thanks).
Regarding FBW and displacement rather than force feedback, the reason that displacement is viable is that the protection laws can prevent you over-stressing the airframe. Hence there's no need for force feedback to tell the pilot to ease off. As Airbus point out you can get rid of a whole lot of complication and reliability problems by
not providing force feedback, I agree and that too is in the quoted post. There are other reasons why it's essential to have protection laws on an Airbus, but I won't bore you with a discussion of C* based feedback flight control laws and FAA regulations.
As far as source data, I conducted what I consider to be a solid literature search, I'd note that the references quoted go from 1987 through to 2007. The use of side-stick controllers was a hot topic back in the 70s and 80s, and the US DoD was funding a lot of research into it that resulted in the USAF's F-16 side-stick controller (as an example). Their conclusions are still pertinent and I see nothing that has rebutted them. I also cautioned about drawing too general conclusions from work in the lab, my experience is that when you get into field trials things can often be very different from a human factors perspective.
I'd also note that the work by Corps (1988) was written by an insider to the Airbus program about the Airbus teams experiences with FBW and side-stick controller, you cannot really get a more contemporaneous and pertinent source than that. I summarise from that report how Airbus developed their dual input resolution functionality, it took several iterations and some incidents in the field before they settled on the final form. The paper by Corps is still good read, I recommend it.
Amadis, yeah everything on the interwebs is so true
That's why I put my big smiling dial on my blog, tell everyone who I am, what my background is (system and aerospace safety, human factors etc) and give a list of my peer reviewed publications. All posts are open, I invite constructive comment, respect opinions other than my own and if I get a fact or conclusion wrong I correct it.
I hope all that helps in clarifying my position, which is that I am neither an Airbus-Boeing fan boy nor a hater, the real world's a little more nuanced than that.
Here's the link to the infamous post
Pilots in the loop? Airbus and the FBW side stick « Critical Uncertainties