Barking Mad, re, "Why are so many on this forum obsessed with new shiny hardware solutions which will not be fitted to ALL airframes til long after the next few high-altitude LOC accidents?"
Not only will they not be fitted for years, but the instrumentation is already available and installed. The key is in knowing one's aircraft and systems and using them correctly, bearing in mind that no installation is perfect in preventing accidents.
Let us look at some of the examples which may be driving this desire for "new" instrumentation, and why I think that such a drive is focussed in the wrong direction.
AF447
The key to AF447 as we know was to "do nothing", except maintain thrust and pitch attitude. The airplane was already stable; a loss of airspeed indication does not affect airflow over the wings or engine thrust.
Some systems will be lost of course. In such a case, one must slow down, respond with measured actions, then first of all aviate which means stabilized the airplane, (even if here, that meant "doing nothing"), then deal with the ECAM or EICAS and the loss of airspeed indication(s), for which there is the UAS drill including Airbus directions as to when to apply the "flight not at risk" section of the UAS drill, (which states that pitch and power must be maintained and not changed, while values for those two metrics are looked up in the QRH).
A loss of airspeed indication at cruise altitude, in and of itself, does NOT put flight at risk and it is NOT an emergency - it is an abnormal. Thirty-one other A330 crews faced this problem successfully. I would not say the "cause" was the loss of speed information but the absence of SOPs and cockpit discipline. No set of new technical gear or software is going to fix what was/is a training and checking matter.
UPS1354
If "new, improved" instrumentation is desired we might include something that may have prevented for example, the UPS A300 accident at Birmingham - a "side-view" of the approach showing the aircraft's actual height above ground, with a display of actual terrain, (from the EGPWS database).
Certainly there was crew fatigue involved and FAA regulations which do not consider cargo aircraft crews as susceptible to fatigue like passengers crews are. But the fact remains that non-precision approaches such as the one which resulted in this accident (because the crew was late in getting the GNSS approach in and the airplane didn't capture it), are higher-risk approaches, and a "side-view" horizontal situation would have made a difference, particularly if predictive arcs were present much as they are in the NAV displays of the B767/B777/Airbus series, etc. when descending to a set altitude.
Airbus BUSS
The Airbus "BUSS", (Backup Speed System) only works at/below FL250 due to Mach Number effects on stall AoA, (which are much lower at cruise Mach Numbers). One must still know the drills and know one's airplane.
As an aside, it will be well worth establishing why the QZ8501 crew was not able to recover a very-likely-stalled aircraft. What was unavailable to this crew and what did they do to try to recover? AF447 was recoverable with sustained, (about 50"), full-ND stick, even moreso in lower, thicker air. (I'm not re-arguing anything here, just trying to understand why the notion of "new" technology has legs.