5:Spurious warnings, cautions and whatnots are far more common that real ones.
If we are talking about stall warnings, this does not seem to be the case, not in AB anyway. The 767 and 737 had their problems it seems. ATSB, at least mandates reporting of All stall warnings.
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2012/ar-2012-172.aspx
6:Spurious alarming data is not immediately distinguishable from actual alarming data.
It can by definition not be distinguishable, otherwise it would not be alarming. Unfortunately non useful reactions are 1) panic or 2) ignore it 3) decide it is "spurious" - in any order.
Useful reactions one assumes are part of the type training of pilots.
c) actually taking the aircraft by the scruff of the neck and putting it roughly where it should be has become a HUGE decision accompanied by much trepidation.
should this not be AAA* priority 1 rather than c? - though possibly inserting a "gently" or "carefully" somewhere? The Quantas A380 exploding engine crew seem to have done it right, others less so.
8:Spurious protection triggers can expose passengers to random dumb designer mistakes. (Too trusting of sensors without appreciating the "what if" hypothetical scenarios. Which happen from time to time)
I am far from convinced that there are many "spurious protection triggers" or "dumb designer mistakes". No, I am not a pilot, but I have been intimately involved in real time safety critical software design, realisation and testing. The overwhelming majority of the work is actually involved in the "what ifs". Unfortunately in some situations there is just not enough information for the software to continue reliably. Why the Bus can not default to sensible neutral values of thrust and pitch (and trim maybe) before dumping it on the pilots I do not know, I have only worked on environmental software for AC not FBW.