TCAS II is not a perfect system and I would much rather see something that is optimised for FJ use
That is what was said back in 1992, and why a bespoke system was developed for Fast Jets. It was tested and proved to be a success during flight trials. Recommendations were made in 1997 to produce a production model with an in service date fo 2004 (Information not mentined inSI report). Nothing happened. We are now attempting to install TCAS in Tornado, and perhaps Typhoon, some twenty years after declaring it far from ideal, and only because three people died on 3rd July 2012.
In a reply to a recent written PQ on risk MoD declared that the Typhoon's overall risk to life is "0 in 1000", simply because no one has died, yet. This approach on risk assessment, within the MoD (which includes the MAA), has remained unchanged for years. How does this sit with the DG's report? Perhaps the DG has the Tornado FAI in mind, which appears to have gone from "Unlikely" to "Probable" over the last six months, and he is just trying to protect his back. If he wants to be really brave he should declare the risk of collision for Typhoon as not being ALARP.
DV