PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Why is sat - inflight data backup not used ?
Old 15th Jan 2015, 16:10
  #18 (permalink)  
Ian W
 
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: Florida and wherever my laptop is
Posts: 1,350
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by dClbydalpha
Ok Pack2 I'm interested.
Well I am if it is the whole infrastructure, can you send me a hint as to where I can find more info please? If it is just the aircraft side, then it doesn't need much development I could have one working this afternoon.
Is the intent for it meet ED112s data requirements? If not then I can't see it being a realistic backup, but it would still be very useful for other purposes.

Unfortunately even with the technology available there are big legal issues over who has access to and responsibility for the data. At the moment it is only necessary to "secure" data after the event and so it is relatively low quantities on stand-alone systems.

Qantas A380 - all systems have to be capable of being disabled for a variety of reasons, it's just a matter of difficulty. The question is where do you want to move the design compromise between normal and abnormal operation. That is a numbers game I don't have the values for, but I agree that flight following data should be reconsidered in the FOSA.
See Qatar pushes for live aircraft data streaming | Avionics content from ATWOnline for the announcement from Qatar Airlines.

Iridium Next will support bust data at broadband speeds as will the later versions of INMARSAT. Of course for many events the aircraft may also be LOS to a VDL ground station that would also be able to accept a burst of data. Most ACARS messages are sent over the VHF network rather than SATCOM.

Since the late 1990's there have been several aircraft 'lost without trace' not including MH370, there were 3 aircraft with significant POB with 73 people 'lost'. (if Wikipedia is to be believed List of aerial disappearances - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia )

Setting up trigger conditions for a burst of data should not be difficult. Ensuring that someone in the cockpit with knowledge cannot interfere with it is more difficult.

Privacy should be simply assured by using layered encryption that requires two decryption keys to decrypt the data with the actual transmission being made to a 'trusted third party' - perhaps IATA, SITA or ARINC. They cannot decrypt it alone, nor can the airline decrypt it alone so bored airline managers cannot look in to see what was being said about them in the cockpit.

Bandwidths are increasing continually beyond the bounds of what was thought possible. It would not be surprising in future for aircraft on startup to connect to a 'cloud' via VDL or SATCOM or both, and stream basic DFDR data continually throughout the flight with full DFDR and CVR data if certain conditions occur. Charging will be per connection not on bandwidth.

Yes the number of DFDR/CVR not fount is very small. However, the costs of all the searches for them is larger than huge - look at the cost of just one day of SAR activity . I suspect that if Qatar's trial is successful that Allianz (or whoever their insurer is) may offer a significant discount providing some ROI for the airline for equipping their aircraft.
Ian W is offline