Based on MoD’s reports and admittedly with my non-aircrew limitations;
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FF u/s you say. Don't think anybody is getting airborne without mode 4 at that point. Get shot down by red crown pretty quick methinks.
IFF wasn’t functioning fully, it at all, because the Mission System wasn’t initiated. Ark Royal’s IFF was U/S. The Inbound Sea King’s IFF and radar was limited due to enforced change in radar mode.
IFF on off broken fixed who cares!
Aircrew should, as it is a No Go item. The RAF lost a Tornado the same day because the IFF system design implementation wasn’t correct.
First you say no-one would get airborne without Mode 4, then Who Cares if it isn’t working. The Tornado crew got airborne because they thought it ok, and died not knowing it wasn’t.
Why would that be relevant? Do you think that any of the other helicopters even had the ability to see an IFF? Or had TCAS. Or were even radiating!?
According to MoD, the other Sea King was capable, although limited in range. The HMS Liverpool Lynx, which had encroached into the CCZ, was radiating in the sense her radar was working as was her I Band transponder. Don’t know about the US aircraft. The lack of IFF return from Outbound was concerning the sole observer in the rear of Inbound. A minor distraction perhaps, but maybe significant at a time when the pilot and other observer were desperately trying to locate her.
Radar not functioning. Hmm. Really? An aircraft that has only one purpose which is to be an airborne radar and they were going flying without the radar? I think not. Did it perhaps have limited functionality?
Inbound was limited, as above. Outbound was in Standby.
This might seem like a strange question to someone with no knowledge of maritime ops.
Let's assume for the sake of argument that the bagger was getting airborne without a serviceable radar. For fun maybe. How exactly do you think that this would affect the collision? What do you think that radar does/is good for?
The Mission System (radar/JTIDS) is fully integrated with the IFF. Each relies upon the other. The screens display IFF data. The interface is facilitated by the Mission System Interface Unit. Neither Sea King could get accurate information from Ark Royal due to her radar limitations and IFF being U/S. Thus, the Defences in Depth against the risk of collision were eroded completely. As stated by the BoI.
An aircraft with u/s JTIDS, u/s radar is no more dangerous than all the other aircraft in the air that day not fitted with JTIDS or radar...
The operating procedures are written on the assumption both are serviceable, but it is important that they (and hence Safety Case) also include possible deviations. (Equally, I assume, the assets it is controlling must know what to do if Mk7 falls offline). This gets to the root of the original question. What instructions was Outbound working to while waiting to see if the Mission System could initiate? And what did the instructions say about what to do and where to go while waiting, and when to abort?
And had they trained for this yet in both Full Mission Trainer and Sim, given the RTS only provided a Switch On Only clearance (“not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever”)? I’ll be honest and say I think this was an error, but it’s a hell of an error to make in the Master Airworthiness Reference and indicative of this entire area not being managed properly.
The Mk7 differs enormously from the Mk2. Both RadHaz and time to initiate software meant the radar could never be fully operational deck to deck. Essentially, the Mk2 could radiate as soon as the interlocks were freed when the swing arm deployed. But the Mk7 would have to wait longer. The BoI refers to this at length. What is also clear from the reports is that in certain respects the ship’s procedures hadn’t changed from Mk2, despite the aircraft form, fit, function and use being completely different. The need to change designation from AEW Mk2 to AEW Mk7 (ASaC was a late affectation) was THE big clue.
Here’s another question for you. Why do you think the Comms/GPS passed full integration testing and trials in 2000, yet in 2003 Time of Day was not integrated with UHF radios? Who agreed to de-specify or de-modify the aircraft to such an extent? And were the Trainer, Sim and Aircraft Specifications (and hence Safety Case) modified to reflect this new Build Standard? Was there a problem with Time of Day in general? Bearing in mind the GPS was only capable of providing 2 ToD loads without a Buffer Unit, was this Buffer unit serviceable, or even fitted? In which case JTIDS, IFF and/or Comms may not work or have intermittent problems. When trying to load software, does the routine include looking for and verifying ToD? If there was a problem, that MAY explain why JTIDS didn’t load. Just a thought, not addressed by MoD.
Edit
UHF voice was obviously working because they were talking to the ship.
I think the reference was to the 2 ARC164 HQII radios, which weren't integrated properly, meaning the system wasn't working to spec, and that assumed by the Trainer and Sim. The AD3400 V/UHF radio was, I assume, working. You'll know which one they used to speak to ship. I'd speculate it wouldn't be UHF2. The Mk7 was the first aircraft to home through an encrypted hopper and this entire area was fraught with political machinations, as the US had de-modified the ARC164 without telling MoD, meaning you lost 50% functionality. Mk7 restored it, but the RN let it slide and didn't resurrect other ARC164 users, so if there was migration of LRUs due to maintenance, the Mk7 could suddenly find itself with a very limited comms fit. Same applied to crypto, which was to spec in the Mk7, but not on the Merlin or Lynx. Migration meant degradation. Sorry, details details, but it all adds up and must be understood by investigators.