Pack2;
Not sure what your background is (meaning I don't want to insult your intelligence! ;-) but in re, "
There is a system being developed as we speak to transmit FDR data direct from the aircraft in real time..once up and running my guess is that aviation authorities will mandate it for airline operations... "
Such systems are already in place and functional.
I am working with an airline that tracks their aircraft real-time using satellite streaming. It's not an ACMS or ACARS-based system. It is one solution to the regulatory requirement regarding dispatching and flight-following here in Canada; the system not only tracks aircraft from power-up to power-down and displays such information through the web, but is capable of real-time data transmission to the airline or, if the airline chooses to keep costs down, can send data when pre-set parameter thresholds are exceeded. It works no matter where our aircraft are in the world. The capabilities and the possible solutions to present concerns are obvious.
In terms of "events", we can create for example, high-'g' events or flap overspeed events which can be transmitted real-time so that our maintenance people can take action at the next landing. The (Canadian) tracking company we use already have STCs for such installations, not a small investment by any measure.
The point I'm attempting to convey, which is one that any airline exec who knows his or her business will get right away, is that riding off in all directions at once in a knee-jerk reaction to recent events and shrill calls for this and that system is not the way to go about researching serious and complex investments in flight safety systems. I'm supporting the notion that rather than reacting for
reacting's sake because the flavour of the day has changed from stalls to finding lost airplanes, a measured, carefully-considered response, which always takes time as does the introduction of regulatory reform, is by far the most expedient and effective way to implement change. The thought-process expressed above provides the foundation for this approach. There is no need to have real-time, full-time data-streaming via satellite for the world's aircraft - that's just a massive waste of limited resources when the very solutions sought are already available and relatively inexpensively at that.
dClydalpha;
Agree on keeping systems capable of being shut down. I was more thinking of the INMARSAT data being sent to RR from MH370, which of course is transparent to the crew and can't be shut down from the cockpit - but such a manufacturer's secure-data system wouldn't interfere with flight or convey proprietary information to non-qualified/authorized users.
Vee1.rotate;
My sincere thanks for your note. I was either unaware of or had forgotten the cited accidents, but was hoping that someone "out there" would be able to supply counter-example information for the discussion.
Certainly, the geo-political comes to mind and also the rapid advancement of electronic and physical search technologies which led to the discovery of AF447's crash site.
In re your comments,
"Of course the geopolitical landscape has changed with the end of the cold war,however I would not rule out that another aircraft might be lost over a war zone or a very unstable country where the recovery of the FDR/CVR is not possible for political and/or security reasons.
The same applies to the other reasons, those of site inaccessibilty due to terrain or depth.While I agree that technology has advanced , I still believe there are areas where nature will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to access (or for that matter, even locate) the FDR/CVR,even with modern technology.
With todays competition in the airline business and the resulting constant cost reduction /minimizing that is taking a high priority within many airlines, I am not too optimistic about the quick implementation of either constant data uplink or more pilot training.",
One reason for suggesting the alternative capability, (transmission of data only when certain thresholds are reached), is that I know airlines are incessantly challenged in controlling costs. The decisions made that I am familiar with regarding our own capabilities are certainly governed by these requirements for balance between such capability, costs and revenue generation. That is why I chose to take a "statistical" approach for the discussion. I am making the assumption, (intuited from accidents I knew of, and now added-to by your contribution), that any such "disappearance event" (including war zones), may very well occur at about the same rate for which other engineering probabilities are calculated, that is, 10
-9, (bearing in mind the caveat I provided in the second post). Roughly stated, there are going to be such events but, as with all things in aviation, they must be examined for probability as well as possibility and investment of resources decided upon and defended thereby. I'm a flight safety guy so you know where my priorities are.
PJ2