RE various posts:
FDR CVR recovery will tell some things about what the aircraft did, and what the pilots did, but not why the pilots did it, which is what
prevention really needs to know. What 'new' money would be assigned to finding
why pilots acted as they did in future incidents?
RE Algol, last seen at #1966 (though currently pg 99 will not load): ”Having seen the aircraft after the event, and spoken with my colleagues,
it was no ordinary CB. NASA commented that the flight probably only penetrated the outer edges before they turned/got spat out. They also speculated that further penetration would almost certainly have resulted in a breakup.”
Virtually all forum comments to date treat cb's as dangerous but infer some kind of ordinariness about them. A quote such as “There are cb's in Europe too” infers European cb characteristics are within a range of characteristics that include ITCZ cb's, enabled by a wide but vague inclusivity of cb characteristics, that also manages an equally wide acceptance of moisture complexities near the equator.
Re FullWings perma:
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post8825000
“You had to agressively reduce the AoA by pitching down to a far greater degree than in any other flight phase.”
Given the factors of narrow cruise speed range, limitations of live weather info, and inability of aircraft or pilots from recovering from wx caused or faulty instrument upsets outside of a narrow AOA range, 'more training' suggested by many seems to offer very few benefits.