THS, currents, automation
We have one pic of purported bulkhead with THS by one A320 mechanic, a quite different pic found online purported to be A320 THS bulkhead, one post other than my previous noting the significant differences, and no further comments confirming one or the other. We've had no precise description of the structure on which the FDR is mounted, other than aft of the pressure bulkhead in the unpressurized tail. The FDR is on or near this bulkhead. Resolving the discrepancy should not be difficult given Prune readership.
If as multiply described the tail is resting semi-inverted on vertical fin and right horizontal stab, access to the FDR should not be impeded by mud. The obstacles to investigation/recovery via diving have been ocean 'currents'. Distinctions between 'current', 'tide', and current tidal interactions in the area of search have not been made. Search reports about the process all cite limited visibility and strong currents. The first tail pics came from a time of 'unusual brief current calm', of which there has been little of since. Hi tech remains subservient to mud and currents.
As a pilot, and from pilots I have known, very few of the heavy pilots would say "If I had been in his position I'd be dead now." The self confidence needed to overcome doubt during command too easily condemns those who ended up dead as inadequate in some way. Yet every pilot has in their history instances of 'What he hell is going on".
I find the vociferous arguments between posters here claiming piloting mastery of specific flight control systems, but having completely conflicting views about how things actually work in specific but not impossible situations to be very disconcerting. That is why the issues of specific complex systems and human interface won't go away. If 95% of posters here had the same opinion about how systems work in unusual situations there would be little discord, and a passenger could feel confident that training, experience, ATC and flight control system functionality were working together well.
The claim that flight control automation has saved more lives than it has cost, evidenced by lower accident rates, is an assertion that rides on the shoulders of improvements in component dependability, airframe structures, materials, aerodynamics, and better and more weather reporting. The claim may be true, but the amount of truth may be much lower if the safety improvements delivered by all other advances are removed from the calculation.