NigelOnDraft
I’ve seen many times the claim that the FO held the stick back when the stall warning was sounding.
Looking at Appendix 3 of the final BEA report it doesn’t seem as simple as that.
The initial input was nose up, but when the stall warn sounded briefly, FO moved the stick to nose down, and the stall warning stopped.
The only sustained input nose up was between about 2:11:40 and 2:12:30. But even before that started the THS had trimmed full up, and it was game over.
With the benefit up hindsight (and the FDR) we know what the AoA was; they didn’t. They only saw pitch.
Of course, this disaster wasn’t a single point failure; had they had yokes instead of sidesticks everyone would have seen what was happening. Yes, I believe the stall warning sounding when they gained speed added confusion. And yes, had Air France paid the extra to have AoA indicator that would have helped too. And had the THS made a “tick tick” as it motored inexorably nose up they might have addressed it…
You asked at what IAS the AOA sensors should cut off. I maintain if the speed is so low the AoA sensors aren't working then the stall warning should be!
I saw you are less willing to criticise the designers and certifiers. But I am less willing to criticise the pilots. There are, of course, times when it’s clearly pilot error. But when a crew of three all fail to understand what’s going on perhaps it’s all too complicated.