We'll have to disagree. I think having stall warning disabled by low IAS (frozen pitots?) is a significant weakness.
What do others think?
It took 3x ADR to "fail" (albeit for the same cause), and it then took the crew to misinterpret/mishandle the situation so badly they stalled the aircraft. NB the crew identified they had lost IAS indications, and they then climbed >7,000'/m.
They then got a (genuine) STALL warning, but maintained nose up control inputs. As a consequence the AoA exceeded 40 degrees (!), and TLs were selected to idle (!!). It was only after this we got the speeds becoming invalid and the Stall warning ceasing.
At some point nose down inputs were made, such speed and Stall became valid again - however, AoA remained >35degrees.
The (very) low IAS caused the stall warning to cease,
not the frozen pitots
AFAIK. I grant you, 3 simultaneous frozen pitots could have caused the issue, but I do not believe it did here.
So if, by definition, the IAS of the aircraft fell below that considered a "cutoff" for the AoA sensors to work, do you still consider that the systems should still have declared the sensed AoA values as "correct"? And I ask again, down to what IAS (CAS)?
If we now move to the consequence of the Stall Warning on/off, clearly it added some confusion to this crew. However, whether an IAS <60K is considered in the certification process I do not know? Let us presume that the Stall warning had remained - do you really think that crew would have correctly recovered from this stall? This was
not what we practice in the sim - a slow declaration to a stall warning, and concentrate on a technically beautiful recovery NB never stalled. This crew had ignored the Stall Warning, and got into an AoA / Stall regime I doubt any Airbus has even been in to including with TPs. The Nose Down attitude to recover (30+nd?) would have been horrendous, and I am not sure I could have been convinced to push that hard for that long (and I'm a current aerobatic pilot, ex-mil fast jet, RAF ex-QFI etc.).
So I am less willing than you to criticise the designers and certifiers of the system. I do not know the Fault Analysis tree, and probabilities assigned, in the design.
AFAIK the design has not significantly altered since? (but might be wrong). I am not saying the system is perfect, but the events that occurred that night I do not think would have been considered credible. And the cure for that night is not in systems (re)design, but crew training - which IMO has hardly made a dent in the basic flaws. Relevance to AirAsia? No idea...