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Given the heavy automation in the systems, the question is, how does being suddenly thrown into a situation where the automation *isn't* working as expected and where you have to rapidly figure out both the technical and human elements of it, something which makes these sorts of mistakes more likely than they should be?
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Agreed but if that point can be reached, surely there must be some 'emergency red button' which just disables all automation and "hands back manual control" from whatever law or state the system is currently in/resets all warnings.
this is the sequence of auto flight technology development;
1) First a basic airplane with flight control cables routed to the control surfaces.
2) autopilots developed that have servos that move the cables.
economy drives industry to design aircraft that fly closer in to the edges of the stability envelope, enter stability augmentation systems or yaw dampers.
3) autopilots grow in sophistication with the capability to control aircraft in all three axis and control power, follow navigation signals and move the rudder in response to yaw damper demands.
Up to this point there was a "big red Button." The autopilot, "george" could be turned off and the pilot knew that he was controlling the aircraft control surfaces with no other input. The pilots control columns were linked so that movement of either moves the control surfaces and the other control column. Also the same is true of the autopilot. When george was flying, the control columns/control wheels/ throttles moved and gave feedback and reference as to just what george was up to.
then economy drives industry to want to eliminate the cost of routing control cables/rods and hydraulic power to each flight control, enter fly-by-wire.
4) An autoflight/flight control computer/autopilot system must always fly the fly-by-wire aircraft. there is no manual control to back up to. Worse than that, the autoflight system has various degraded modes that it can step down to.
This new type of aircraft control is not so bad in the event of simple single malfunctions. The problem is that if the pilots become complacent and fail to be up to the minute with what is going on with the performance of the airplane and then encounter a malfunction as in AF447, they are in a bad situation and starting from behind. They must determine which indications are accurate and at what level the autoflight system is operating. Combine this with "stick and rudder" skills that atrophy with continued use of autoflight and rare use of manual flight, the problem is compounded again.
Yes, pilots made bad airmanship mistakes in airplanes with control cables. A DC-10 crossing the Atlantic using vertical speed control to climb to a higher altitude stalled and fell thousands of feet breaking in and out of stall because the pilot flying did not know to unload the wing to recover. The other pilot took over, recovered and the flight landed in Miami with a damaged elevator.
Worse, pilots do not always have the most up to date information on the technology they are operating. Prior to the AirBus crash at New York Kennedy, pilots were taught that below maneuvering speed they could safely fully deflect any control surface. It was not common knowledge that this was not true in the case of sudden control reversal. It is alleged that a sudden abrupt reversal of the rudder snapped off the vertical stabilizer.
The day will soon be upon us when we have pilots who have never flown an aircraft that had fully manual controls. We will develop aircraft, avionics and procedures to deal with this and keep flying as safely as possible but the old axiom applies;
"Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."