There are no links to engineering studies of blade creep or erosion in that presentation.
Also, the entire premise of the presentation, while valid in a general sense, is not a strict scientific or engineering approach. For example, it discusses "average thrust reduction" for an airplane or fleet over time. It does not distinguish between a fleet where EVERY takeoff is done with a 20% reduction, and a fleet where 50% are done at max rated thrust, and 50% are done with a 40% reduction.
The real telling point is the comparison of the charts on pages 5 and 8. While both charts are generic, we find on page 8 that the right side of the chart is almost never used in reality, because the operating limits are set to avoid it completely.
Also, the "Maintenance Material Cost" shown on page 8 likely reflects the engine mfgrs' practice of pricing engine usage on a scale that reflects "average" thrust reduction, again with no regard for the distribution or frequency of max thrust events. I don't know how that graph can be taken as operational "truth" when a 40% takeoff thrust reduction results in a climb thrust significantly greater than takeoff thrust. The note on the bottom of page 8 supports my assessment.
My "about 10%" statement comes from information I found in a Materials Engineering course 30 years ago, regarding life cycle fatigue. I have no specific links, but the clear message was that most turbine wear happens at the very high end of the design limits [of RPM and temperature] scale, and that only "normal wear & tear" is expected when the actual cyclic limits are at a modest level below the stated limits.
I don't know how "all" airlines buy/lease engines and/or engine maintenance. MANY of them have separate lease terms for engines and airframes.