The problem is, and will always be, that any 'strategic' analysis will be coloured by what we've got in the toy box and what on order from Toys r Us (BAES), and (of course) how much pocket money we can beg and take in advance.
Accordingly, responses to security risks (incipient problems) and threats (emergent problems) will be equipment-focussed, rather than effects-based.
One example I recall from a few years ago in MB, was when we entered in to long discussions with the Army over the introduction of loitering munitions. They were convinced that the only answer to attacking time-sensitive and dynamic targets was loitering munitions (kamikaze UAVs, for ease of explanation). They just didn't get the concept of joint fires, ie the kinetic effect is what is desired, not necessarily the means of delivery.
Of late I have been involved in guiding the drafting defence strategies for an emerging economy, and they follow the cascade method from Grand Strategy, National Security Strategy, National Military (defence) strategy and so forth. It works; but they are also prepared to fund the resultant programmes.