This one crops up regularly and one can only have empathy with those endeavouring to find black and white answers floating somewhere in the grey porridge.
Consider -
(a) the Certification Standards (ie what the AFM says) have stood a reasonable test of time under fire so, as a first approximation, they represent a reasonably good risk approach for the general case.
(b) in an emergency situation of one kind or another - which impacts on landing performance - the normal standards may, or may not, be feasible and the commander has to come up with a recovery plan for the situation. He/she is expected to use all available resources and information in determining what the gameplan is to be ..
(c) if the result at the end of the day is less than desirable the operator and crew (commander in particular) can expect censure of some sort according to jurisdiction
(d) all the relevant players, presuming survival for the crew, can expect to be quizzed aggressively as to their decisions and actions .. food for thought ?
(e) if you don't have a really good story .. you may find yourself in a state of unpleasantness. The
Sydney collision mishap in the early 70s, while not directly relevant to the landing problem, illustrates the detailed Monday morning quarterbacking to which the parties may be subject and strikes me as a salutary lesson in after-the-event activities. Although the memory is fading on the specifics of this one, my recollection is that the subsequent damages action resulted in an approximate three-way damages split for the relevant parties .. which included the B727 commander.
(f) what to do ? - my suggestion, regardless of rules and however you may choose to interpret the State protocols, is
(i) if you CAN recover in compliance with the Standards, why would you place yourself and your passengers at jeopardy by accepting a more critical requirement ? After the subsequent mishap (which may not be related directly to the decision) what will be your story in Court ? You can bet your superannuation and house on opposing counsel's endeavouring to assign much importance to that decision ..
(ii) if no compliant recovery solution be available, one needs to have done (within the time constraints on the day) relevant and defensible risk assessments to arrive at the apparently best solution. Again, expect to be quizzed mercilessly if things don't go according to plan.
(iii) if there is no sensibly desirable strategy available the folk on the spot just have to do their best .. sometimes the outcome appears to be miraculous (eg Sioux City and the Hudson River) while, with others, the crew is largely taken out of the loop (eg O'Hare and various midair collisions).
In all cases there will be all the time in the world for the subsequent witch hunt to explore the minutiae of the history.
That the commander may only have had seconds just reflects the basic unfairness of life at times ..
once in flight, as long as ALD < LDA, you may land "WHATEVER".
That's a very brave outlook on risk management. In my view the result is a near foregone conclusion which the crew may reflect upon while sitting in the weeds (or worse) somewhere in the overrun or beyond ... If emergency considerations provide no feasibly preferred option, so be it, but one had best have that decision process neatly tied up in bows for the Inquiry.