gums, I'll chime in with some thoughts - see how it goes...I'm quite open to starting a new thread, but if I may...
It seems that the AF447 accident attracts these kinds of discussions; - twelve thread's worth in fact! We might even say they're the "go-to" or perhaps the springboard when discussing the kinds of human factors and technical aspects of aircraft automation that this accident in particular, has highlighted and that they're applicable to a wide range of technical and engineering endeavours. We can include the notion of competency, and what it looks like (because it is certainly changing!). What I like about staying on the AF447 threads is that those who may be seeking the lessons from this and other, similar accidents know that this is the place to come.
I''m particularly concerned that those who manage large aviation organizations who may or may not actually fly and who may drop in to PPRuNe will click on "AF447" and begin reading a discussion that is both directly related to their oversight responsibilities and has broader lessons to offer those who have grown up with software/hardware/firmware "solutions" to commercial flight and may not be aware of the "principles of aviation".
I think it is fair to agree that the carrier involved in the accident has lessons for all carriers and operations, both military and commercial, large and small. The mark of a "just culture" is the willingness to discuss such issues with a view to taking the lesson without judgement, for judgement in aviation will always make a fool of one, eventually. The reason why is simple - many carriers are still not learning from others' mistakes...
I have heard first-hand the comment from pilot-managers that their carrier was "beyond an accident" as they had "learned the lessons". I have heard comments that their fleet type doesn't need flight data analysis, for example, because, unlike other fleets (which did have flight data analysis and had "events"), their pilots were good and followed the SOPs and nothing was being reported. Seriously - I have heard this. I am quite sure things have changed since then; I hope so.
Such attitudes are, in and of themselves, precursors to an event. Such attitudes would have a corporate history and a "supporting cast" where groupthink and the value of "concensus" are the unwritten rules by which one maintains one's position within the organization, and who may not even know that their tolerance of such statements fosters the normalization of deviance and a culture of enhanced risk.
I think those interested in finding ways to recognize and possibly change their airline's culture may visit something to do with "AF447" because of the well-known human factors and organizational issues behind the accident. While I believe strongly in the examination of ideas, (philosophy) and also in hangar-flying, not everyone may gravitate to a discussion which would be, in my view, a very worthwhile thread but which value may not be immediately apparent. Despite the contributions wishing to persuade readers one way or another regarding the legal or technical specifics of the causes of the AF447 accident, these twelve threads hold a treasure-trove of experience for new players, in both cockpit and the office.
For most, the lessons of AF447 are now quite far beyond the actual accident itself, and the value of such discussions from contributors who know their stuff and have lived it and can write, like gums for example, is immeasurable for those with eyes and ears and a strong keeness and skepticism.