Like MoD, there are parts of the NHS which run with supreme efficiency, and parts that are riddled with fraud, corruption and incompetence. In both, the good bits are often those free of direct political influence or staffed by those that resist it.
The defence budget isn’t all spent on equipment and I’ve never seen an answer to the question – are comparisons with other countries made on a like for like basis?
One must look at fixed and variable commitments. Broadly, very different parts of MoD are responsible for each. In simple terms, the former aren’t up for grabs. The potential for savings narrows considerably. These fixed (or very difficult to vary) commitments include the likes of PFI payments. Did I mention fraud, corruption, political influence and lack of bottle?
The tendency to live beyond our means, while hiding the cost in a credit card. This caused much of our country’s recent ills in the first place, at an individual level. I wonder how many went into the red last “Black” Friday? The difference is, the Ministerial policy makers aren’t personally responsible when the bill eventually comes in; they’ve retired on honking great pensions. Similarly, those in MoD who signed their name to false statements that this was a good spend against the defence budget. A responsibility conveniently delegated to them by PUS and Ministers, whose names don’t appear on the contract. In effect, Government policy requires such staff to commit fraud. In fact, the Government and MoD openly admit this.
Then, to “savings”. What does that mean? Savings that do not affect operational effectiveness, or savings for the sake of savings. Usually it means the latter. Our leaders simply don’t want to know about the former, because by definition it exposes prior incompetence and fraud. That is why, for example, the Chief Accounting Officer (PUS) has never implemented the various internal (never mind external) audit reports that spell out in excruciating detail that his senior staffs consciously waste money for short term protectionism.
There is always much chatter about how the defence budget is spent and poor performance. You seldom hear the politicians ask about success stories and how to learn lessons. A year ago I’d have said “Never”, but last year the House of Commons Defence Select Committee Chair (James Arbuthnott at the time) asked this very question and sought a short report on an aircraft programme that was delivered ahead of schedule, under “budget” and to a far better specification than requested. Arbuthnott then stepped down and now the Committee doesn’t want to know. Kudos to Arbuthnott for trying to open the box, but it tells you much that he only did it when he knew he was going. The political pressure from above to perpetuate inefficiency is overwhelming; and it is the same in MoD. (In 1999, half way through that programme, the old Chief of Defence Procurement was up in front of the Public Accounts Committee on the same subject. Instead of telling them the truth, he was deliberately briefed a pack of lies that showed MoD(PE) in a poor light. Why would you do that? The answer is simple. The bar shall not be raised. Always dumb down).
I’d like to see “GOCO” implemented properly. (Oops, shouldn’t put it like that, because Bernard Gray presented it as his own idea. Update and re-issue the 1991 Def Stan). Start with a well-defined domain, like avionics. In parallel, revamp MoD’s commercial operations. There was nothing wrong with the practice of having contractors draft the proposed contract (same Def Stan, and if a GOCO bidder didn’t suggest this I’d exclude him!), leaving a smaller number of better trained MoD staffs to scrutinise them before signing. And forget the nonsense that only Commercial can let contracts – that was and always has been a dangerous fallacy and major constraint. Those simple areas cause so much delay and waste, not to mention diverting highly trained staffs from their primary role when the resultant problems have to be fixed.