PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Southwest Captain Reduced Power Before NYC Crash Landing
Old 21st Nov 2014, 18:28
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AirRabbit
 
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Originally Posted by peekay4
(AirRabbit Comment)
I would wonder if the instructor who trained this pilot was ever aware of his tendencies to “rivet” his attention to one particular reference … apparently to the exclusion of all the others that should remain an active part of his scan?

(peekay4 Comment)
The FO said the PAPI was his primary reference during approach; he did not say it was his only reference. He stated that his crosschecks were the PAPI, the runway, and the airspeed. He said he also referred the glideslope every 3 to 4 crosschecks. (Ref: NTSB Interview Summaries, pp. 17-18).

The FO was an instructor himself, w/ 22 years in the USAF flying F-15C and F-117s. He was a T-38 chief evaluator until he retired and joined SWA. At the time of the accident he had 1,200 hrs at SWA.

People make mistakes; One would hope someone with his flight experience has the basics of flying (and landing) down pat.
I don’t know the gentleman myself … only what has been reported. I also agree that it would seem logical that any pilot with the experience you indicate was had by this pilot, would, indeed, mean that he “has the basics of flying (and landing) down pat.” But, and with all due respect to this particular gentleman (and I say that knowing what kind of pressure anyone is under during an accident investigation – and I have no desire to impugn his character, professionalism, or competency), it still sounds a “bit off” to say that he was using the VGSI as his “primary” reference during the approach – particularly in that the glide path information provided by the VGSI at LaGuardia Runway 04 is not “coincident” with the ILS glide slope. In fact, as the ILS Glide Slope transmitter is located 1102 feet from the threshold, and provides a 3.00 degree glide slope, an “on glide slope’ indication over the runway threshold would be at a height of 57 feet, 9 inches; and the elevation according to an “on visual glide slope” indication of the VGSI at the same location over the runway threshold, is reported to be 76 feet.

As an “after-the-fact” onlooker, it would seem that if the PF was using the VGSI as a “primary” vertical reference, and was, indeed “on that glide slope,” the airplane would have crossed the runway threshold at 76 feet and would have been 18 feet 3 inches above the “on glide path” indication of the ILS. I don’t intend to have this get into a Mathematics/Geometry lesson, so I’ll let the mathematicians in the group determine what those kinds of numbers actually mean. Additionally, if the PM (pilot monitoring – the Captain) was indeed “looking through the HUD system (on which I would presume was displayed the ILS localizer and glide slope information) would it be beyond reason that the Captain recognized that the airplane was “high,” over the threshold of Runway 04, some 7001 plus feet short of the East River, at whatever airspeed at that time. Is it possible that the PF could have completed the approach at his then-current rate of descent, flared, touched down, reversed the engines, and stopped safely on the runway? Where on that runway would the touch down have occurred? How much braking would have been required? If you were the Captain, what would you have done? My sense is that at least some of you would say “I wouldn’t have let it get that far…”
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