Bergerie1;
Thank you for your response. How the present situation will resolve is anyone's guess but at present rates of intake for young pilots, something has to give...either growth, or the accident rate. A "cadet" system only works when there is a larger system in place, with a history, to teach newcomers the ropes. The alternative without any such apprenticing/mentoring, (unpopular terms these days, I know), is newbies in the cockpit who don't know what they don't know, re-learning old lessons anew with people in the back.
In some quarters, the conversation regarding these points has begun, and more broadly I sense a population fed up with the present disparity between those who have access to a multi-trillion dollar U.S. economy and the far more vast numbers who do not and who are shut out of the promise of a vibrant economy.
The sources of our own industry's present problems may be found in these larger matters, but I'll stay on-topic.
blind pew;
A couple of comments if I may. First, thank you for your comments.
We dwell in a technical milieu in which attitudes towards experience may be contrasted with the more technical notions surrounding "accreditation". In short, one is "qualified" if one has done "the training" and "has the licence", regardless of what one actually knows or what one can actually do both in terms of quantity of work and quality of work.
The latter two, (quality and quantity of work and knowledge), are assumed by those examining the formalities of training such as licences, diplomas, certificates, degrees and awards, all of which are supposed to represent "the back room" work done to achieve such formalities. It is an assumption which, like most assumptions, (and opinions!), requires constant re-evaluation and inspection, as well as an overarching stance of, "should we be doing this? - is this a good idea?" I think the 1500hr rule was a quick, sausage-making response for example.
In one way, this is the essence of SMS, and is also the very best reason why we need solid regulator oversight in what I think could be a very good system. However, the regulator itself must understand how things have changed.
A system based upon accreditation, documentation and audit processes works in high-risk industries so long as one is permitted and encouraged to hearken to experience, or "historical learning", or "brain trust", etc.
Your example of cuts to training programs illustrates the point beautifully, (and who hasn't seen such cuts in their own organization?).
The final arbiter of standards, the regulator, which may both set and enforce standards or merely enforce standards imposed by a country's government on their aviation system, will always bend to lobbied interests. For example, the long and sad story behind Fatigue Risk Management Systems for air carriers remains watered down with only a slight, concessionary bow towards the considerable science and industry, (flight crew) experience. Airlines must survive and in a heavily de-regulated industry, some have managed a respectable longevity, but not without the compromises you speak of, which can only come from a (heavily-lobbied) government regulator.
As we examine this, suddenly, there is another side of this argument which few have examined: Not only may standards be lowered, but in this new environment where accreditation, documentation and metrics of a system govern behaviours, (out of a fear of liability), we actually see reductions in a willingness to "go beyond" the standard not merely because it is more expensive (in the short term), but because such is not "accredited" in the regulations and therefore there is no way to quantify or measure quality of such initiatives.
In other words, if it is not recognized or governed in law, is there risk of liability by doing that which is not formally required?
Such a view seems ridiculous, doesn't it?....keep standards close to only what is required, for to go further may open one to risk of liability.
If we contrast this with the notion of "best practices", the counterargument when experience and history have less currency than documentation, etc., may be, "according to whom?"
I wouldn't say that the entire aviation system suffers thus, and as always such observations are made of a very complex system upon which thousands of books, articles and theses are done every year.
I've flown with pilots of the kind you describe - crusty, WWII guys, sharp airforce guys, sharp civilian guys who got their bones staying alive in the north, in the mountains or on the water. It can be done, and a fine pilot can be "made" starting out with only 250hrs of light-twin time with a keen, disciplined mind and a keen spirit. One took it on the chin if one wasn't "keen". I doubt if any cadet program teaches as well but the MCPL is where the industry has chosen to go.
One thing is for sure: The Profession of Airline Pilot has taken a beating, and unlike other professions save medicine & engineering, the outcomes have material consequences. I think there are a lot of guys and gals "out there" who know this and are quietly trying their best to retard the retreat. In a time when unions have all but been destroyed as the only agencies representing ordinary people and their interests, it is time for flight crew representatives to work even harder to retain authority over their profession to exercise their considerable understanding of what makes and keeps aviation safe.
I think this is the larger message of recent accidents, including the topic of this thread. While the technical aspects of the Air France accident are fascinating particularly for those who fly, or who flew the Airbus, the human factors story is far more relevant, but as yet has not, in my opinion, been examined widely enough.
Last edited by PJ2; 21st Nov 2014 at 16:50.