Originally Posted by
Winnerhofer
SR111 is an interesting comparison with AF447.
SR111 went by the book whilst AF447 forgot the book yet both ended in tragedy.
Knowing what you can ignore is as almost as important as knowing what you need to pay attention to.
Hmm... I think while there's a general point to be made there, I'm not sure about the specifics.
As I understand it, the deal with SR111 was that "the book" was inadequate for purpose. Not in the same sense as AF447, where it appears AF were somewhat lackadaisical about passing Airbus's UAS addenda on to crews - but from the very beginning at MD. (emphasis mine) :
Originally Posted by SR111 Report Section 2.7.3
A review of several checklists showed a lack of emphasis on treating any amount of smoke in an aircraft as a serious fire threat. For example, neither the Swissair nor the McDonnell Douglas Smoke of Unknown Origin Checklist stipulated that preparations for a possible emergency landing should be considered immediately when smoke of unknown origin appears. Rather, on both versions, the reference to landing is the last action item on the checklist. Similarly, the Swissair guidance provided to flight crews was that the aircraft was to land at the nearest emergency airport if smoke of unknown origin was "persistent."
If I recall correctly, I think it did become something of a moot point because at the rate the fire propagated, even if they'd gone for a straight-in at Halifax when the smoke first appeared, they would not have had enough time to make it to the runway.
The crucial difference between SR111 and AF447 is that the former crew were faced with an aircraft which was going to depart controlled flight anyway - and quickly - due to the fire damage, whereas AF447's crew had an aircraft which - despite a transitory problem - was quite capable of staying in the air with little or no crew interference.