The NTSB's late October interim report (cited in the second thread post) includes the CVR transcript. It IS WORTH reading.
While I'm absolutely NOT a driver of flashy jets, I know my way around the ATC system and I've had to read far too many of these transcripts. Sorry to say it, but this one truly does not read (or sound) like a pair of professionals.
Thanks to external reports, this on e of the few cases in which we know what "Personnel Action" was taken following the accident event: The Cpt. was dismissed (as in FIRED!) and the FO
ordered to take additional training. Frankly, I was not impressed by the professional performance of either one - and the FO is fortunate in that he apparently retained his job.
I recognize that cockpit communication included a great deal of non-verbal communication in addition to what we hear and read. In this case, the close attention to details, especially during the critical, sterile period below FL100 does not seem to be present. I reads like it was lightly and fluffy rather than 110% business details, not quite what one would expect during a weather-relevant approach to LGA or any other NY area airport.
From other details I also must conclude that Madame Captain should have executed a G/A someplace between 1000' and 500' and was simply not paying close enough attention to the PM's responsibilities, perhaps also trying to be a second PF in the process. Stuff happens, but this crew, on this approach just makes me
.
Since I am NOT a Big Flashy Jet driver, I expect the usual flames
and I'll take them. The general attitude in this cockpit is simply different from most others and, IMO, something less than what is expected
.