Huck - you nailed it.
But the FO isn't harmless. Boeing's written report shows how an increase in power took an airplane that was on a staple approach to a situation of trending high, long aimpoint, and shallow descent path that only achieved the required descent rate for a second or two after the a/p came off. The rest of the time the descent rate, path, or angle never achieved the parameter necessary to stop, let alone reverse, the divergent trend.
If you look at the last page or two of the FDR report (Section 18?) the voice overlay shows the CA making a callout at both one and two dots high on the GS, which is also four whites on the PAPI, about 'get it down'. The FO never corrects and the CA eventually intervenes but basically removes both pilots from flying the airplane.
So the CA intervened at poor flying and rapidly made it brutal. I can't call it 'brutal flying' because there was no flying done after 46' AGL. I'm surprised the FO's survival instincts didn't kick in and neither he, or the CA, made a last second attempt to arrest the descent rate.
We look at approximately 2.5 degrees nose up all the time on final. I can't imagine looking at zero, or negative pitch attitudes, at such a low altitude when the expected input is steady or increasing pitch attitude.
Last edited by misd-agin; 2nd Nov 2014 at 14:53.
Reason: Added "after the a/p came off"