It is right and proper that in this incident we separate the (rather pointless) ATC initiated go-around from the actions of the crew. Because it is totally reasonable that ATC should expect us to be able to execute a go-around whenever they say. However, I think we are entitled to ask why go-around instructions are issued. But I don't think we'll get the real answer because managers with highly risk adverse parish council mentality have moved into ATC management. These people will whip out their safety flags, H & S credentials and "you can never be too careful" statements and attempt to bluster their way around the real issues. An example, although totally off this thread, is the quoting of "threshold elevation" on the ATIS of Scottish FIR airports. Someone has seriously lost the plot.
So Cossack - Can you tell me how safety is improved by ordering a go-around? Just because a procedure is written down it doesn't mean to say it has value. As someone has written earlier, a dead bird or bunny on the runway killed by the preceding aircraft will be one less for the following aircraft to bump into. Ingestion is just smoke-screening the real issue, backside covering pointless edicts from above. Tell us and let us decide.
Returning to the flying training issues:
Surely both of these blokes will have done multiple two engined go-arounds while doing AWOPS in the Sim?
Not necessarily and besides, you know it's coming. You will have prepared during the previous few weeks and rehearsed the words like an Shakespearean actor and delivered the required performance on the day. LOFT exercises in the SIM are also a 'hop through the hoops' jobs and for many, it's a "get out of the SIM ASAP". A colleague (who is also an instructor) I know once commented as he went into the main section housing the SIMs "Can you smell it?" "What?" asked our instructor. "Fear!" he said "The smell is leaking out from all of these moving boxes." And that sums it up. We are forced to deliver on time, on budget and failure to do so results an uncertain future - one that could have huge repercussions for you and your family. I'm lucky, I can handle it but there are many who can't.
It is fair to say we waste vast amounts of time pratting about with ridiculous scenarios. Ones that could be better handled in classrooms and/or procedure trainers. A better investment might be to spend some SIM time handling the second tier most likely to occur events or ones requiring complex handling procedures - two engine go-arounds, wave-offs, engine failures other than at V1, bird-strikes, lightning strikes, instrument failures etc. But having said that, our company's (re-current) type training programme is trying to do this and we are getting results. But we still have a long way to go but there are many companies who will have further to travel.
This TCX incident merely highlights the holes in our systems. Both our training and checking is deficient and needs looking at.