Clearedtoreenter -
Sounds familiar? We don't even need a 50/50 case here. The CVD (non)issue is a case in point that has shown that even when we have a wealth of evidence against some of the stupidest red tape, the red tape wins. As for Part 61 and the tax payer money that's been wasted on that labyrinth of red tape!
CASA red tape reduction? Do me a favour! I wonder where that [email protected] email address actually goes...doesn't matter I guess. Keeps the natives quiet for a bit longer maybe though eh?
Good points you make CTR...
Basically put RTR is simply not in the current Fort Fumble's DNA..
Until such time as the organisation is totally gutted & the trough is emptied; they will continue to obfuscate their required responsibilities to the present Govt policy of red tape reduction...
.
However I do wonder if they have underestimated the heavy commitment by the RTR crew to their cause, after all the RTR program is not only heavily backed by the PM but is also administered by his department i.e. the PMC...
Perhaps those IOS members contemplating responding to the FF bollocks - FF self-assessed RTR audit results - should cc to the OBPR, PC, PMC, TA & his Parliamentary Secretary Josh Frydenberg...
The following passage is from Part 3 of the
PC Audit Framework (my bold):
Other institutional developments
In addition to their election commitment to audit the performance of government regulators, the current Government committed to a number of other initiatives relevant to the issue of regulatory burden on business. These include:
• the issuing of Ministerial statements of expectation (SOEs) to the heads of Commonwealth regulatory agencies.
• the establishment of deregulation units within each department and agency
• requirements that each department and agency audit and quantify the cost to businesses and individuals of complying with regulation
• the establishment of Ministerial Advisory Councils, consisting of industry stakeholders, for each Cabinet Minister
These developments also have implications for the implementation of the proposed regulator audit framework, particularly the issuing of Ministerial SOEs. For example, ensuring some degree of consistency between SOEs for regulators and the principles of good practice used in the proposed regulator audit framework (effective communication, a risk-based approach to inspections, proportionate responses to compliance breaches etc.) could achieve greater commitment to the overall process, and enhance the prospects of achieving genuine improvements in regulator performance.
The Government is in the process of developing a whole-of-government risk management framework. The critical element of any risk management framework is the recognition of the cost of managing risk relative to the benefits achieved. These benefits depend on the probability and cost associated with the risk and on the effectiveness of the efforts to reduce risk or to mitigate the costs should the risk eventuate. This audit framework, as it focuses on minimising the cost to businesses while achieving the objectives of the regulation, should support the adoption of a risk-based approach to enforcement and compliance by Commonwealth regulators that will form part of this broader risk management framework.
Across many developed countries, there has been a tendency towards increasingly strong regulatory interventions to reduce risk to the public. In part this is because the demand for many of the things that regulation addresses, such as safety and the natural environment, tends to rise with income. But it is also due to false perceptions of risk, and a lack of understanding that many risks cannot be easily removed, and that attempts to reduce one risk can easily result in risk transfer rather than risk reduction (see for example, Bayer 1993, Graham and Weiner 1997).
As set out by the OECD (2010) a comprehensive approach to risk management would include:
… comprehensive regulatory impact assessment of the full portfolio of impacts of risk reduction efforts; both ex ante (prospective) regulatory impact assessment to inform initial policy decisions, and ex post (retrospective) regulatory impact assessment to inform subsequent policy revisions and to improve ex ante assessment methodologies; even-handed use of regulatory analysis both to discourage undesirable policy proposals and to encourage desirable policy proposals; greater use of economic incentive instruments in regulation; and better coordination and oversight of risk regulation policies across agencies within each government, and across governments internationally. (p. 12).
As summarised in table 1, Australian governments have a number of these elements in place already. However, Commission studies have found that not all regulatory impact assessments function as well as they should (PC 2012), and that gaps remain in ex post assessment of the need for and performance of regulations (PC 2011). Moreover, while Australia has been a leader in introducing risk-based approaches to regulation with many regulators adopting these approaches, there is still considerable scope for further improvement (box 2).
Rigorous application of the framework set out in this paper should work to reduce unnecessary compliance costs. But more fundamental efforts will be required to ensure that regulation is only implemented and continued where the economic and social benefits exceed the costs, and that where this is the case the most cost effective approaches are applied. This will require a more informed conversation with the Australian public about what governments can do to manage risk and what it will cost, not just for government but to businesses and other regulated entities, and the public more generally. The costs are not only financial, but include ‘social’ costs such as curtailing individual freedoms and eroding personal responsibilities.
The first bullet point (above) on miniscule SOEs perhaps highlights another major roadblock for effective reform, not only with the RTRP but also for the ASRR. Here is a reminder of the desired outcomes by the miniscule in implementing the 'Forsyth review':
Outcomes
The report of the review will:
- examine and make recommendations as required on the aviation safety roles of CASA and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and other agencies as appropriate;
- outline and identify any areas for improvement in the current interaction and relationships between CASA and the ATSB, as well as other agencies and Infrastructure;
- examine and make recommendations as required on the appointment process and criteria applied for key aviation safety roles within CASA and the ATSB;
- examine the current processes by which CASA develops, consults on and finalises changes to aviation safety regulations and other legislative instruments (such as civil aviation orders) and make any proposals for improving these processes such that new regulations are best practice in safe operations for each relevant sector of the aviation industry;
- review the implementation of the current aviation safety regulatory reform programme and assess the effectiveness of the planning and implementation of regulatory changes, including cost impacts on industry;
- examine and make recommendations on options for improving future aviation safety regulatory reform having regard to international experience and stakeholder views, and the Government's objective of reducing the cost of regulation to business;
- provide advice to Government on priorities for future regulatory development and implementation strategies; and
- provide advice to Government on options for improving oversight and enforcement of aviation regulations, including rights of review.
And here is the Coalition intended policy in regards to FF prior to the election:
a. Strategic direction
Enhancing CASA’s capability as Australia’s aviation safety regulator must start with establishing a firm strategic direction for the organisation.
Following the Review referred to in initiative three above, the Coalition will issue CASA with a new statement of strategic direction as allowed under Section 12A of the Civil Aviation Act 1988.
However many of the IOS strongly believe that until you change certain sections of the Act...
Example from AMROBA submission (page 25
here): "...
CASA once had a Mission Statement that stated “a safe and viable aviation
industry” which kept the focus on making “business-type” aviation requirements instead of the descriptive detail that is in legislation today.
Recommendation 2: Amend 3A to read similar to the NZ Objectives: e.g.
a) CASA to undertake the government's functions in a way that contributes to the aim of achieving an integrated, safe, responsive, and sustainable aviation system; and
(b) to ensure that Australia’s obligations under international civil aviation agreements are implemented.
The changes can include many points currently in the Minister’s Strategic Direction to the Board and the CASRs can be used to provide regulatory direction to promulgate CASSs..."
...the effectiveness of a strongly worded miniscule strategic direction, under s12A (SOE), to CAsA (under the current regime) would only serve to reinforce the Iron Ring's continued embuggerance of the industry...
{Comment: Not to mention we have an ailing miniscule, asleep at the wheel, that apparently doesn't give a toss about fostering & promoting the aviation industry...
}
However, perhaps too slowly for some, the winds of change are happening and with continued sustained pressure from the IOS etc. the GA industry may yet be saved from extinction.
To me the FF RTR self-audit results are a signed confession and should be exploited as such by the IOS...
MTF...
