So what should be do with this crew then AG? And what should we do with anyone else who doesn't come up to your standards? How will we choose who gets the chop? How will we stop crews practicing for their "chop rides" in the real aircraft with passengers (like people used to do when we could all fly better)? And how many of your colleagues will be looking for new jobs? And when we start assessing other aspects, maybe the non-flying elements of our job, will you be up to it?
This is an example of a crew who got it wrong after having got up in the WOCL and who had been on duty for just over 11 hours, executing a manoeuvre they will have hardly ever practiced or done in real life (I'm lucky, I've done quite a few in the recent past for a whole variety of reasons - usually me). Unfortunately for this crew, after getting the initial action wrong, the rest of the flight continued in a similar vein. The crew were then frustrated because the aircraft appeared to fight them, preventing them from being able to get back in the loop. And let's remember, the captain knew he fouled up the G/A and imagined the consequences (looming internal demotion). Not the best frame of mind to start dealing with a problem, even if it was of your own making.
So what would have helped? Firstly, regular training to do a standard, two engine go-around. I don't think I've done more than ten in 20 years in the sim. In the real thing I've fouled up two - both of which caught me unawares, which is no excuse but I'm sure practice would have helped. But recently, I've being doing rather a few yet I'd still like more practice. But for this crew, once it started going wrong, they had no tool to do the aeronautical equivalent of stopping the world. It just snowballed... There has to be something that would work for a B757 to give a crew 5 -10 seconds of breathing space.
Lastly, this crew is not unique. There are many, many crews like these and the same initial go-around fiasco is highly likely. The same outcome though, is probably less likely. Our training, both in the manually flown past with the ex-airforce choppers and the modern, CRM orientated, mainly autopilot present has many useful bits missing. It's just damn shame that this AAIB report, with 20-20 hindsight, only told us that they crew didn't get it right. And had they done what they should have, then this incident wouldn't have happened. Gosh! What insight. Maybe it was written by the office junior. It wasn't up to their normal standard. A little guidance might have been useful or even some hazard identification.
PS. Their company's internal report does appear to show that TCX has a future because it looks like they understood what happened and that is where you start fixing the real problem.