It is all very well treating this as though it were just one mistake, a poorly executed g/a, but it wasn't. It was an appalling series of basic blunders and fundamental errors that began with the failure to cope with a cocked up g/a and showed a crews far behind the aeroplane they were unable to recover from one mistake
Any of us might foul up a g/a (worrying as that is in itself) but the knock-on failures that cascaded on from this original incident is surely proof that the crew simply weren't up to the job. Excuses of pressure, base changes arc are utterly irrelevant, it is the Captain's job to retain Captaincy and both of them to retain competency, all of which they manifestly failed to do.
This is a classic case of insufficient competency, clusterf*ck brought about by a single simple error. A crew unable to recover from a simple error like a botched g/a has no business in the business. Sorry, blunt as it is, its the reality. It's also not just an abject failure in technical skills, the highly questionable decision to divert without proper consideration of landing distances required shows an inability to apply reason to the situation too. = total overload - the one drop extra that caused all the water to fall out of the sponge.
You have to wonder at the competency of a crew that can't do a simple non urgent 2 engine g/a , but one that can't cope in all that comes after after this goes awry is way, way out of line.
No excuses for this sort of thing, and everything to do with lack of basic flying skills. Even if after 1400hrs on type (ffs!!) the 13000hr ,guy can't see what his FMAs are telling him he must, MUST be able to pickle the whole shebang and revert to first principles, surely?
But if not...
Last edited by Agaricus bisporus; 13th Oct 2014 at 20:23.