The weather in Melbourne as I write this is cold and wet, wind 210 degrees 24 knots gusting to 35 knots with moderate rain and small hail. Certainly not dog walking weather as far as I am concerned. The dog disagrees and waits impatiently at the front door. The conditions today were similar to the weather at Melbourne Airport thirty six years ago when a Trans Australia Airlines DC9 landed 192 metres short of the threshold of Melbourne Runway 27 and got away with it with minor damage. A touch-down a hundred metres or so earlier across the Melbourne to Sunbury road would have been a disaster. Many of today’s pilots flying with Qantas, Virgin Australia and their offshoots had not been born in 1978 the year the DC9 came close to disaster and so they may learn a useful lesson because Melbourne weather cycles don’t change much over the years. The following is an abridged description taken from an Ansett Australia Pre-Course briefing paper for pilots undergoing a DC9 type rating, which in turn was condensed from Department of Transport Incident Investigation Report No 79-2
DC9 Lands short of Runway at Tullamarine
At approximately 1342 hours EST on an afternoon in late Spring, a DC9 aircraft landed 192 metres short of Runway 27 at Melbourne Airport. The aircraft was conducting at ILS approach in conditions of reduced visibility caused by heavy rain. During the ground roll to the threshold, the main landing gear struck and destroyed six lights in the high intensity approach lighting system serving the runway. There were 91 passengers and a crew of six on board. No none was injured and the damage sustained by the aircraft was minor.
The flight was operating from Brisbane to Melbourne with an intermediate stop at Coolangatta. The captain flew the last stage from the left-hand pilot seat. Approaching Melbourne the ATIS was Information Papa. Runway 34, wind 340/25 knots gusting to 34 knots, QNH 1001, temperature 22, cloud 6/8 at 2500 feet with lower patches and showers in the area. ATC cleared the DC9 to initially descend to 3000 ft and advised the runway had been changed to 27 due to the wind coming around to the west at 30 knots. The rapid change in surface wind was associated with the passage of a cold front crossing the Melbourne area west to east at about 30 knots. The DC9 carried sufficient fuel to divert to Sydney.
With 18 miles to run the wind was 240 at 30 knots gusting to 40 knots and visibility 2000 metres in heavy rain, cloud 1500 feet with lower patches. The captain considered there was a probability of encountering windshear during the approach and as a precaution he decided to make a faster than normal approach using a reduced flap setting of 25 degrees. VREF for this configuration was 132 knots which was 10 knots faster than the flap setting for the normal landing configuration of 50 degrees. . He then added a further 20 knot increment to compensate for the advised strong wind gradient and gust effect. He thus arrived at a selected approach speed of 152 knots.
Over Epping locator at 3000 feet neither pilot could see the runway. At about 2000 feet they could see the airport terminal buildings and the first half of the runway but not the control tower. Melbourne Tower advised the aircraft that runway and approach lighting were on stage five. Also that it had no idea of the cloud base but it was quite low, visibility 2000 metres in heavy rain, wind 250 /20 gusting to 30 knots. The pilots recollection of drift at this stage of the approach were confusing: the captain believed drift was about six degrees right while the first officer thought it was about six degrees left. The rain continued to increase in intensity and the windshield wipers were turned on. At 800 feet (400 feet above ground level) the F/O called the descent rate in accordance with company SOP. To the best of his recall it was about 650 feet per minute. He also advised the captain that he had the high intensity approach lights in sight. The captain looked out and also saw the lights.
From this point both pilots concentrated their attention primarily outside the cockpit. The captain stated he supplemented this with instrument cross checks down to about 200 feet AGL while the F/O stated he stopped monitoring his own instruments about 300 feet AGL. At this last instrument check the captain recalled the aircraft was still close to glide slope. He also stated that about 400 feet the aircraft encountered windshear. Both pilots recalled approximately 12 degrees of left drift at this time.
Visibility ahead was poor. Despite operation of the wipers, the rain on the windshield blurred the pilots’ vision and both stated the approach lights were badly diffused. Neither could see the runway ahead and concentrated on scanning for the green threshold lights. At an estimated 100 feet AGL still without contact with the threshold lights the captain stated he sensed the aircraft sinking rapidly. He attempted to counter this by pulling back on the control column, but did not increase power. As the captain rotated the aircraft, the F/O sighted the right hand threshold lights and commented they were looking a bit low. He could not remember making any further comment but the captain recalled that just before impact the F/O said “You are going to hit the lights.” Both pilots then felt the landing gear strike the ground and the approach lighting. Touchdown was in a near normal landing attitude, 192 metres short of the runway threshold.
Six approach lights, in the last four rows leading to the threshold, were struck by the main wheels as the aircraft rolled across the grassed area. The nosewheel probably touched down on the runway just beyond the threshold. The aircraft remained on the runway as it slowed down and taxied to the terminal under its own power. The passengers disembarked by normal means. There were no abnormal pressures on the flight crew to complete the flight without delay but the evidence suggests that there was some haste in the manner in which the approach was flown. A non-standard configuration of 25 degrees of flap was chosen and a high approach selected speed of 152 knots calculated. Throughout the approach an IAS of some 20 to 30 knots higher than that selected was maintained.
From the FDR trace and meteorology analysis, the aircraft passed through the front at 70 seconds before touchdown. Over Epping locator the IAS was about 235 knots and decreasing. At 1839 feet the IAS was about 180 knots, still some 30 knots above the selected approach speed. Average rate of descent since passing Epping locator was 840 feet per minute. As the aircraft passed over the Outer Marker it countered windshear associated with the front and the IAS increased 15 knots to 195 knots over a 10 second period. By 30 seconds to touch down the aircraft was two dots below glide slope and approaching the minimum altitude of 700 feet. Throughout this period the IAS remained in the 175-180 knots range. During the last 20 seconds of flight the rate of descent increased and averaged some 1100 feet per minute and the aircraft rapidly dropped below glide slope. At impact short of the runway the IAS was still 171 knots.
Conclusions.
Among the conclusions were:
The captain elected to make a landing approach during the period of frontal passage and selected a non-standard configuration of 25 degrees of flap instead of 50 degrees. This was unsuited to the predictable conditions met.
There was a major breakdown in crew co-ordination. As a result the flight instruments were not monitored below the minimum altitude.
The aircraft rate of descent increased to average 1100 feet per minute during the final 15 seconds of flight. An illusory effect, induced by heavy rain on the windscreen and wind gust activity may have contributed to this high rate of descent.
The full report is available at:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24850/197802603.pdf