*sigh*
**double sigh**
I understand the first sentence. The rest is incomprehensible.
The data prove the greatest risk of vacuum pump failure arises immediately after the 'benefit' of human intervention. Just like injectors on piston engines.
It's worth reflecting on the abject ridiculousness of the implications of the Brazier matter.
As I noted above, the Service Manual that was relevant in the Brazier matter specified vac pump replacement no later than 500 hours' TIS or 12 months, whichever came first.
The vac pumps in question in fact continued to run beyond 500 hours' TIS and 12 months. In the case of the left hand pump, it continued to run for more than double that time. In the case of the right hand pump, it continued to run for more than triple that time. And at the point this atrocity was detected, the pumps hadn't failed - we actually don't know how long they would have continued to run.
Yet Australia's bone-headed rules, driven by a bone-headed regulator, say that's 'dangerous' and Mr Brazier is a 'criminal'. Minor issues like data disproving the validity of the arsepluck in the Service Manual are a mere bagatelle.
The people flying around in that aircraft were, of course, at risk of a 30,000 death plunge. They would have been much "safer" if those vacuum pumps had instead been replaced twice or thrice, with the resulting doubling and tripling in risk of failure.
Sheer brilliance.
