Originally Posted by thf
Before the stall: The biggest puzzle, in my opinion, is Robert. He did notice that Bonin was behaving erratically. But he didn't follow up on that thoroughly enough. Why not? Langewiesche has the idea that, when Bonin took away his control immediately after Robert took over, Robert didn't notice this and wondered why his sidestick didn't work. Maybe that is a clue: Did he think his machine was uncontrollable even before it really was? If you want to question unconnected sidesticks, I think that would be the moment.
Not too sure about that as the airplane was already stalled when Robert took control.
That being said, not knowing how Bonin was actually dealing with the sidestick, he possibly lost trust in the FCS integrity so asked Dubois to switch off or reset some FCCs.
Originally Posted by PJ2
It is a common one when doing various tests within a Just Culture, but I think it is particularly relevant here when we're trying to sort out ways of examining cockpit behaviours, ergonomics and human factors. What it helps do in normal practise of airline work is place issues succinctly before those who must manage a Just Culture on a day-by-day basis and handle events which their airline's safety and data programs present, some of them serious. They are examining the "incidents" before they occur, so to speak and this is one way to sort out which way to focus when fixing a problem that is emerging in the data.
Airbus missed the opportunity to apply that Just Culture :
http://www.pprune.org/7450265-post576.html