CONF iture;
Thank you for your response. As you know though the data is thin, we have more examples of control columns in the full-aft position than we do sidesticks when loss-of-control or a full-stall has occurred.
It is true prima facie that when you can't observe something you can't make a judgement of it but there are numerous clues to the condition of the aircraft still present. There are only two examples in which these clues did not help the crew - the Perpignan crew, because the AoA sensors were frozen and the crew would not have been able to diagnose the problem to respond correctly, and this one which had the descent rate indication with the nose-up and full power.
If the stick is "contributory" then the control column logically (for the argument to work), must not be and this is not the case.
Cool Guys, re, "I really think the designers of this system could of been a bit kinder to the pilots."
Well, in what way?
I can only think of one, and it occurred to me the first time I flew the A320. IIRC correctly, during the takeoff roll the "iron cross" symbol was in view and one could see what the other pilot's stick was doing. As a "beginner" on Airbus I thought it was an excellent solution to the relative lack of visibility. But then the symbol disappeared just after rotation and I honestly thought, "whaa...?", because, I thought, it was so useful to see what the other guy's stick was doing. And it never came back during any phase of flight, and I thought it should any time the autopilot was disengaged, particularly on final.
But as I flew the Airbus types, "knowing" became second-nature and the position of the sidestick not being a source of direct information, (primarily because the movements are so tiny that it is not possible to judge position relative to the stick's 'null' position), became irrelevant and the PFD and engine instruments became primary - subconsciously, as we do as pilots. The "sources" of aircraft state changed from what I knew in the Boeings/Lockheeds/Douglas's, and though subtlely different, it worked as well in all the circumstances I encountered. I suspect you'd get roughly the same notions from any Airbus pilot.
Though there are almost two dozen examples of crews stalling their transport aircraft over the past dozen years or so, I doubt if we'll see an accident like this one again. But we'll see others for reasons discussed and well understood.