Interesting Aviation Week Editorial about AF Pilot Strike
Someone forwarded this interesting editorial from Aviation Week (written by Pierre Sparaco) to me - it is timely and I think it applies to many of the other legacy Euro airlines, but AF in particular:
Once again, Air France-KLM’s management finds itself blocked from implementing a change in strategy. And once again, it is the cockpit crews who are balking. Crews and their unions have not yet come to terms with the increasingly dominant role of low-cost carriers in the European airline industry, so they routinely reject the urgent need to restructure France’s air transport sector.
However, the Air France-KLM group is nearly equally culpable for the disconnect between management and personnel and has contributed its own share of missteps. Long before the Franco-Dutch consolidation move became a reality, Air France turned a blind eye to the growing threat from the low-cost sector. Fifteen years ago, a top airline executive told me the low-cost business model would not succeed and claimed that startups such as Ryanair would never acquire a significant market share.
Today, European low-cost airlines carry a combined 200 million passengers per year with a fleet of nearly 1,000 aircraft. Moreover, Ryanair is now the biggest intra-European carrier and is planning to operate 520 Boeing 737s in the next 10 years, up from 320, CEO Michael O’Leary says.
Air France now acknowledges the need to launch a robust counterattack; it plans to expand its low-cost subsidiary, Transavia, which has two branches—one in France, the other in the Netherlands. Air France-KLM Chairman/CEO Alexandre de Juniac says Transavia will operate up to 100 aircraft by 2018. But the long-overdue growth plan could be delayed or even canceled if pilots refuse to ratify it. One of the many issues that has pilots upset is management’s plan to implement a two-scale salary policy.
Transavia pilots, whose ranks include former Air France pilots, are expected to be paid at a slightly lower rate than they now receive, to help the airline achieve competitive direct operating costs, a prerequisite to a successful counterattack in the European route system. SNPL, France’s dominant cockpit crew union, firmly rejects such a plan and claims all Air France-KLM group pilots should benefit from unified salary scales. In the last few weeks, the dispute has become even more heated and resulted in a walkout plan that could jeopardize the company’s efforts to restore profitability.
Given the decades-old acrimony between the union and management, many analysts are skeptical of an early resolution. SNPL-member pilots have a long tradition of vindictive reactions that extend well beyond operational matters. For example, the SNPL long rejected the implementation of two-person cockpit crews, which forced Air France to cancel an order for Boeing 737s. Today, union representatives are claiming they should have been canvassed, giving them a chance to reject or at least debate a plan to establish a new salary policy.
But there is a key difference this time around. Air France is no longer a state-controlled company and no arbitration can be expected from the government of Prime Minister Manuel Valls. The outgoing transport minister, Frederic Cuvillier, showed little interest in the French airlines’ difficulties and his successor, Alain Vidalies, seems ready to follow his predecessor’s route. In other words, Air France is now paying for being so slow to react to low-cost competition and for not convincing its pilots (as well as the court of public opinion) that a former flag carrier—now operating in a fully deregulated environment—could be so seriously endangered by new competition forces. Recently, a political leader warned: “Even airlines die.”
Adopting the broad view, it is key to understand why and how pilots succeeded in extending their perimeter of influence. This conduct began to materialize in the 1960s and has never been studied as it should, by psychologists, not aviation experts. French pilots are extremely proud of their prestigious past; they take pride in referring to famous pioneers and the Aeropostale’s glory days. However, this adulation of the past is interfering with the “course correction” needed to adapt to modern times. This balking is detrimental to the airline and its personnel alike.
Today, U.K.-headquartered EasyJet is the second-largest “French” domestic operator and Ryanair is Europe’s biggest carrier in terms of passengers flown (more than 81 million this year). Air France, however, continues its drastic decline. French airline pilots could be accused of writing Air France’s epitaph.