Dozy, sorry, no, you're misunderstanding my statements.
Apologies if that is the case...
The frustration if there is any at all, is knowing that "more automation" may be the answer some arrive at...
It's definitely a possibility, but it would appear that in at least one case, the thought process is going the other way. Remember this thread from a few months back? :
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...sics-a350.html
Airline managements of the eighties made the fundamental mistake of assuming automation could be the third (or second) pilot and saw a huge financial benefit in terms of training and hiring
I'd say the "brain drain" and the rise of MBAs in lieu of long-time airline experience in management really only took hold in the late '80s and early '90s. In day to day terms the state-of-the-art in FMS and automation hasn't really altered a great deal since the advent of the B757 and B767 in the late '70s/early '80s (and yes, I know Airbus pioneered a lot of it with the A300 in the early to mid-'70s, but as I understand things it was the then-new Boeing types which really cemented it as part of the norm). I think that when modern FMS/automation systems were introduced, it was still at a time when the builders assumed at least some airline management could be trusted to be sensible. Of course, with the drain in airline management experience towards the end of the decade, it could be reasonably argued that the monkeys had been given the keys to the banana plantation - and if the example of the "basics" push from Airbus is a sign of how things are going to go, then there's some hope that the balance will go some way to being redressed.
particularly when the "best-and-brightest" candidates as Sully put it, were no longer choosing commercial aviation as a profession. It's a huge story as I know you and many here already know.
Sure - however I would caution folks to beware the allure of the rose-tinted spectacles when looking at the past. In particular, blind pew's book contains some truly eye-popping examples of cadets being rushed onto the line before they were ready in the midst of a long-running industrial dispute. And this was at a well-known British airline back in the late '60s and early '70s, a period which quite a few of the old guard consider to be a golden time if reading stuff on here is anything to go by.
It's no secret that remuneration and benefits for pilots have been eroded considerably over the last few decades, but this is true of pretty much any profession (excluding banking and management) anyone would care to name. And with airline travel becoming such a commonplace thing, the truth is that what the airlines offer prospective pilots is a job with built-in expectations of unsociable hours, long periods away from home and family - and a pay packet which compares unfavourably to that of the branch manager in the local bank.
The "fright" is part of aviation and part of the business.
Of course - the point I was trying to make being that recognition of startle effect should be trained as part of CRM with a "no harm, no foul" understanding on the part of both parties. By which I mean pilots like Robert and the F/Os on the Birgenair and West Caribbean flights should not have to first consider the potential risk to their careers before being empowered to take remedial action.
Originally Posted by
400drvr
Of course it can be stalled once the computers give up the ghost. It's still an airplane after all. 2 wings, 2 engines and all the other plane parts that make it fly.
I agree with the sentiment, but feel compelled to point out that the computers did not "give up the ghost" during the crucial phases* of this accident. The computers in fact functioned correctly and transitioned to a control configuration which gave the pilots increased control authority while maintaining as many normally-functioning systems as possible. As I've said before, the switch to Alternate Law is essentially only doing what the Flight Engineer would do on older types in the event of a component or partial system failure.
* - The ACARS readout indicates a transitory failure of PRIM 1 and SEC 1 very late in the sequence, but the DFDR data indicates that this didn't affect the behaviour of the aircraft or the system as a whole
@G0ULI - I'm afraid I'm going to have to pick a few holes in your car analogy. For one thing, even most of the current state-of-the-art driving aids only serve to alert the driver to potential hazards. Self-driving cars are still barely out of the experimental phase, and being at the controls of a self-driving car can be the only logical equivalent of the kind of automation experienced at the controls of an airliner in cruise.
The loss of traction control (which is a driving aid - not automation) could kinda/sorta be used as an illustrative example but for one salient fact - namely that a driver used to traction control who suddenly loses it is used to driving with the traction control on, and would therefore experience the loss as a deviation from the norm in terms of handling. However, *neither of the F/Os on that flight deck had ever received any training or experience in high-level manual handling at all* - and there was therefore no experienced "norm" from which the handling could deviate.
Also, the only manual handling experience they did have would have been on takeoff and approach/landing (i.e. at low level) where - I believe - the Normal Law roll rate is greater than it would be at high altitudes anyway.
In the case of AF447 a situation occured where a pilot with relatively limited experience was suddenly required to respond to a situation
Debatable. If the graphs in Fig. 64 of the report are accurate, then there was no immediate danger of departure from controlled flight and thus no "sudden [requirement]" to start manipulating the controls (though admittedly it would take some degree of nerve to cover and observe only).
It isn't necessary to seek out some complicated psychological reason for these responses. They are just normal human reactions to a sudden shock.
The interesting psychology isn't really applicable to the initial shock response - it has more to do with issues arising later in the sequence, particularly the PF's repeated (and silent) use of sidestick priority to take control away from the PNF (even having verbally handed over a few seconds prior) and the PNF's gradually increasing self-doubt over his interpretation of the situation which was - initially, at least - correct.
The initial panic and unexpected responses from the aircraft also served to disorientate other crew members to the extent that identification of the problem and recovery was delayed until it was too late.
Again, inaccurate. F/O Robert was trying to analyse the situation and appeared to be some way to figuring things out, but was likely distracted by Bonin's inputs making the situation worse.