alf5071h, infrequentflyer789, dozy;
Re, "The roots of this accident might be found well before this flight started." - alf5071h
I think it is reasonable to say that this is almost certainly the case.
Over time, many "streams" became the "rivers" which may legitimately be included in the examination of the accident.
The dividing line between proper examination of human factors and the notions of "blame" varies in width, (blurs), depending upon the context of the conversation; it is a useful dialog to have in its own right.
What separates the ample signs of hindsight bias and blame throughout these threads, from the reasonable examination of human factors including command-and-control issues in both the cockpit of AF447 and the wider "rivers" of organizational factors?
It is an important distinction because both must have a venue in which serious discussion can take place.
As with almost all accidents, informed supposition and circumstantial "conclusion" form part of the impressions of what actually occurred in the cockpit of AF447. None can know for sure of course but those who do the work can often reasonably surmise without concluding.
The various theories of why the PF handled the stick the way it was and why these actions continued beyond the point where standard training was to call for drills and checklists in the manner now widely understood cannot conclude anything as we do not have the required data - what was going on in the mind of the PF and PNF and why things came apart so swiftly and why the the captain was unable to take command and why the unstoppable descent rate regardless of pitch and power inputs did not register. How do the notions of "panic" or "freezing at the controls" advance understanding?
Fright and narrowed focus in sensory and thought processes are understandable human responses to rapidly-unfolding events which are both confusing and life-threatening. The industry has known about such factors since the eighties. It created the notions of organizational factors and created CRM techniques, putting Perrow's, Reason's, Helmreich's, Maurino's, Kern's, Dekker's et al. work into practise and using level D simulators to combine forces in reducing the effects of such human, visceral psychological and biological responses. The combination works, as the industry's experience has proven over and over.
But we must explain things: Where and why were the failures here? Unlike the modelling of mechanical failure, can there be no "cartesian" conclusions here but only a thorough surmising?
This does not seem good enough to set improvement and change by. The solution isn't just to do "more CRM" or "more training"; I am familiar with, and have seen superbly-trained, veteran pilots do silly things in airplanes that leave one (thankfully) merely shaking one's head.
Why does this continue, is a question for all human endeavours but is paramount in high-risk ventures. To what levels may our present sciences probe such "skews" in thought and action? What is the model by which we may understand and comprehend AF447; more crucially, what is the understanding that understands, and how do we get there?
I think these are not philosophical questions but material questions on "the critical path" to new solutions.
Last edited by PJ2; 27th Sep 2014 at 19:55.
Reason: syntax