Being a non-pilot, it would seem to me there is one aspect of this accident that deserves further study (which Bubbers touches on) - why would any pilot not only put the aircraft into a stall, but hold it there despite the aural warnings and indications of an extreme angle of attack for several minutes until the aircraft crashed?
It's easy to point out an inexperienced pilot, taught you can't stall an A330 and not trained how to control the airplane in Alternate law. Further I do think it is valid to suggest that the sidestick may have contributed to the PNF not realizing what the PF was doing (unlike seeing the control yoke pulled full back). But I think that misses the bigger point that other pilots have done much the same thing - holding an airplane in a stall while dropping thousands of feet until impact - on non-FBW aircraft with cross linked controls. Some were highly experienced senior pilots that certainly should have known better, and should have been under no illusion regarding their ability to stall the aircraft (Bergenair comes to mind).
So what is going on mentally that is preventing these pilots from recognizing they are in a stall, despite aural and/or stick shaker indications telling them exactly that? If we can figure out the cognitive processes involved, perhaps we can figure out how to prevent future occurrences.