Thank you for your response, RF4. Yes, I do recall the various theories as to why the continued pitch. I'm not sure it's possible to know for sure though I do agree that digging deeper is necessary.
I'm not averse to new notions and am open to theories which move possible cause(s) some distance away from pure human performance factors, but I'm still not clear for example on how PIO is connected to a sustained pitch-up and stall. It does no good to say 99% of pilots don't know what they're talking about as regards PIO, (I've experienced it in Alternate law in the A330 sim but one gets used to it and is careful with the stick), and if that's true and it may possibly lead to a LOC, then there's a problem! In the meantime, we both know even viscerally, (subconsciously) that such pitch attitudes are just never achieved in a transport aircraft because we know the airplane will rapidly lose energy because the engines are right very near their max delivery of thrust and there's just no reserve power for recovery, so how come this one is an exception?
To me the rapid loss of focus and discipline is a more significant series of causes than all other explanations including PIO, the point being that if we are to learn something from this accident, it is in the area of human performance, the clarity of interface design, (warnings, drills) and the presentation of complex situations to those who must assess quickly but who might face such events once in an otherwise quiet, full career.
The Vanity Fair article says something quite valuable in its conclusion:
This is another unintended consequence of designing airplanes that anyone can fly: anyone can take you up on the offer. Beyond the degradation of basic skills of people who may once have been competent pilots, the fourth-generation jets have enabled people who probably never had the skills to begin with and should not have been in the cockpit. As a result, the mental makeup of airline pilots has changed. On this there is nearly universal agreement—at Boeing and Airbus, and among accident investigators, regulators, flight-operations managers, instructors, and academics. A different crowd is flying now, and though excellent pilots still work the job, on average the knowledge base has become very thin.
It seems that we are locked into a spiral in which poor human performance begets automation, which worsens human performance, which begets increasing automation. The pattern is common to our time but is acute in aviation. Air France 447 was a case in point. In the aftermath of the accident, the pitot tubes were replaced on several Airbus models; Air France commissioned an independent safety review that highlighted the arrogance of some of the company’s pilots and suggested reforms; a number of experts called for angle-of-attack indicators in airliners, while others urged a new emphasis on high-altitude-stall training, upset recoveries, unusual attitudes, flying in Alternate Law, and basic aeronautical common sense. All of this was fine, but none of it will make much difference. At a time when accidents are extremely rare, each one becomes a one-off event, unlikely to be repeated in detail. Next time it will be some other airline, some other culture, and some other failure—but it will almost certainly involve automation and will perplex us when it occurs. Over time the automation will expand to handle in-flight failures and emergencies, and as the safety record improves, pilots will gradually be squeezed from the cockpit altogether. The dynamic has become inevitable. There will still be accidents, but at some point we will have only the machines to blame.