Dozy;
You've mentioned a previously discussed key point in all this and that is the complete absence of memory items employed to deal with an abnormality. Instead, the PF launches into something on his own, leaving the PNF out of the loop, bewildered and trying to catch up while guessing what was happening.
Had the memory items been called for and actioned as trained and the ECAM discipline executed as trained, the stall and all ancillary effects of the stall would almost certainly not have occurred.
Some may put the crew's response down to "startle effect" but I don't think so and I don't buy it, for that is what training is all about - to avoid or reduce the effect of surprise and momentary anxiety and to maintain cockpit discipline in the face of elevated risk to the aircraft. The point is to stabilize/maintain control of the aircraft, start the drills/checklists, secure the aircraft and decide the next course of action. That is absolutely standard trained/expected behaviour in an abnormality or emergency, (which this was not, until it was turned into one).
I think there are important lessons here including flight control systems, automation dependencies, FBW design, triage of warnings, loss of the stall signal, movement of the THS during an abnormal flight control computer condition and so on, but the price of such learning in exchange for the original set of behaviours which led to this outcome, for whatever reasons such occurred, is obviously extremely and needlessly high.
Last edited by PJ2; 19th Sep 2014 at 18:21.