Top pick up slats...
The more layers of the onion you peel off the more murky & smelly this whole thing gets...
Here is the whole passage to which slats quotes from:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background
Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd (PEL) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Regional Express Holdings and holds AOC number 1-1 VAV2-0l issued on the 23 October 2006. The AOC permits the conduct of Regular Public Transport (Cargo Only), Charter and Aerial Work operations in a fleet of 27 above 5700kg turbo prop and jet aircraft. Operations are conducted with 2 pilots
(multi crew). The aircraft types include seven Westwind WW1124, two Westwind 1124A, four learjet L35/36, ten Metro III, four Metro 23, and one Brasilia EMB 120 aircraft. These aircraft operate mainly from bases at Sydney, Darwin, Nowra, and Brisbane conducting night freight within Australia, and national and international medivac and passenger charter. Airwork operations consist of target towing for the Royal Australian Navy at Nowra NSW using Learjet and Westwind aircraft. The company has a current application with CASA to vary their AOC to operate SAAB 340 aircraft for both passenger and freight operations.
The funny thing is slats that some inquisitive bugger from the bureau's investigative team in early 2010 obviously discovered the same discrepancy but was promptly shut down by Wodger's mate MAL(I)U...
: 3
Correspondence from CASA to the ATSB regarding the classification of air ambulance flights, received 22 October 2012;(PDF 492KB)
I refer to email dated 31 March 2010 requesting information under section 32 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 in respect of the Pei-Air investigation A0-2009-072.
CASA has reviewed the Doskite and Pei-Air Aviation Operations Manuals and cannot find any reference to Air Ambulance flights being classified one way or the other.CASA is not aware of any changes from Charter to Airwork in respect of Air Ambulance functions. The matter may require further clarification from Pel-Air.
Strange...
...you would have thought the regulator should know to within a minute or an inch of its life, what an operator can or can't do and under what classification certain AOC approved ops are conforming to...
Coming back to the PA FRMS and I remembered that the
Australian Lawyers Alliance had a bit to say (& no obvious skin in the issue..
) on FRMS/CAO48.1 in their ASRR
submission #218. On a second read (or maybe fourth read..
) I decided it was too good to ignore, so here it is from Section 4 para 4.1 in full:
4.1 PEL-AIR AND SYSTEMIC REGULATORY ISSUES WITH FATIGUE RISK MANAGEMENT
Mention has been made above in passing of criticisms proferred by the Senate Committee RRAT Report.33 Many of the criticisms made about the ATSB report of the Pel-Air accident investigation34 are outside the scope of this submission, and include systemic issues as and between CASA and the ATSB. One of the substantive systemic issues reported and agreed to have been a shortfall in the investigation report, was CASA’s lack of oversight of the relevant operator’s fatigue risk management, training and checking systems in the context of a CASA Special Audit which resulted in several CASA-issued requests for corrective action by the operator.35
The relevant CASA surveillance which resulted in the requests for corrective action predated the existing FRMS requirements, but post-dated the commencement of CASA’s original Civil Aviation Order 48.1 which prescribes duty flight time limitations.36 This means that minimum rest time for pilots was set by CAO 48.1 and not strictly the subject of a formal risk management system as it might be argued might now applies to such an operator. The issue then becomes less one of FRMS per se, but one of FRM regulatory oversight. Is a prescribed duty time limit easier to enforce and better than a FRMS which leaves such decisions to pilots and operators in the high demand environment of commercial aviation?
Some argue FRMS is the lesser of two evils, but this submission aims to outline the difficulty in coming to a regulatory solution given the competing interests of aviation operational employees and airline management, in the context of the international standards and recommended practices Australia should adopt, but also recognising the difficulties of adopting any particular standards as all have both economic and air safety consequences for airlines and individuals (pilots and passengers).
Pilot groups have argued that the scientific principles and knowledge said to inform the ICAO SARPs are in fact flawed and that both the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and European Safety Agency Rules (EASA) rules in this regard continue to prescribe actual time limits to ensure there is no balancing of safety through “CASA bowing to industry pressure to deliver a less restrictive system”.37
In our submission the criticism for the Panel to note is that the FRMS rules now applicable by virtue of the commencement of the Civil Aviation Order 48.1 Instrument 2013 (No. 1)38 on 30 April 2013 are not only subject to major contrary views but this view was acted upon by a motion to disallow in the Senate which lapsed when the Parliament was prorogued on 5 August 2013 prior to the Federal Election. Since that time, and following the opening of submissions to the present ASRR, a second motion to disallow was made, and is presently pending for resolution in the Senate by 24 March 2014. These indications of public discontent must not be forgotten in determining a way forward for resolving the debate on flight time limitations.
That being said, an element of circularity exists in what can be done about the situation in Australia while still holding Australia out as a State attempting to provide international best practice regulation in accordance with our obligations as an ICAO State. Departure from SARPs in local law is something which directly affects Australia’s USOAP scores unless a notification of differences is filed with ICAO under Article 38 of the Chicago Convention.
The best solution going forward may be, in this instance, to adopt the approach of the US in 14 CFR Parts 117, 119 and 12139 which provides some prescription in relation to duty limitations and makes FRMS use optional, whereas the Australian approach makes FRMS applicable for current and new holders of flight crew licences but not air operators (AOC holders) until 30 April 2016, unless they voluntarily opt in to the scheme. Certainly, the US approach in this instance may be viewed by industry stakeholders as the preferable option, notwithstanding the costs to CASA of amending the present instrument should it be amenable to that approach. In our submission, the compromises in the US approach better serve the interests of both air operators and secure confidence in the safety of pilots for travellers.
4.2 WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT TO OTHER STAKEHOLDERS
INCLUDING THE PUBLIC?
The ramifications of flight crews exceeding duty time limitations can, at the extreme, contribute to consequences like the Colgan crash of 2009. It can also have ripple effects in practice (eg, flight delays) which typify the cost-benefit analysis which often emerges as a refrain in all facets of aviation safety regulation: airline operations and management’s demands for flexibility in regulation to get on with business and ensure their services – ie, the “product” provided when one buys an air ticket – operate on schedule, versus the rights and responsibilities of the pilot in command who bears the (regulatory) responsibility for the final disposition of any particular flight including the safety of all onboard. This is not a new issue.
However, recent examples where flight time limitations have operated to cause passenger delays by an airline (in addition to economic losses from having to cancel/reschedule an international flight) in circumstances beyond the airline’s control, indicate that some measure of flexibility might be warranted in the system which eventuates in Australia (vindicating the approach advanced by CASA in the 2013 Instrument).
In March 2013 a Qantas flight from Dallas to Brisbane was delayed by mechanical issues, and on 15 January 2014 Qantas (due to unrelated infractions of US DOT tarmac delay rules) received a civil penalty from the US DOT. In the “Consent Order” which described the steps Qantas took to mitigate the inconvenience for passengers of the tarmac delay, it is revealed the flight, which was delayed by more than 4 hours, was ultimately cancelled because the crew’s duty time limitations were insufficient to complete even a flight to an alternate, and closer, destination (Auckland).
Certainly this would have resulted in disruption to the airline in terms of scheduling both its crew, and a replacement flight notwithstanding the unquestionable air safety benefit (ie, no pilot flew tired). However, it also has several economic consequences for the airline in relation to compensation for delay to passengers under relevant international law which may not be so readily apparent, but which should serve as a reminder of one of the many consequences of inflexibility in flight duty times for flight crew members. Under the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage,40 under which most if not all the passengers on the Dallas to Brisbane flight, Qantas would have been liable for compensation for proven losses brought about by delay of each passenger in an amount limited presently to 4,694 Special Drawing Rights (approximately $8,200 AUD as at the date of writing).41 In an aircraft that carries over 300 passengers this amount is substantial. Furthermore, under US DOT rules and the airline’s own policies, refunds of fares must be offered in some cases.
An additional complication of matters arises when one considers that, as is the case in the US, pilots may have contractually negotiated limitations on their duty times.
In the US at least, the FAA has taken the view that the more restrictive FAA rules would not supersede collective bargaining agreements where those arrangements were not in conflict with an FAA requirement.42
In summary then, our submission is that the Panel should ensure in any continuing regulatory reform in relation to FRMS, the multiplicity of stakeholder interests be considered, in the light of alternative States’ ways of handling the same competing interests in aviation law (safety/airlines/pilots/passengers).
Hmm....nah makes too much sense...
MTF...
