This thread highlights many of the significant safety issues in modern operations.
Manufacturers’ recommendations being interpreted as ‘must’ (legal overtones), the limitations of SOPs, poor wording or range of interpretations, none able to foresee every situation, all reducing the need to think.
Documentary dependency, with that of automation, boxes pilots into standard operating scenarios which reduce ability to deal with the unexpected, and in some circumstances creates new operational hazards.
Many areas of the industry believe that ‘that unexpected’ will not happen – to them or in their operation; they have no knowledge of ‘it’. Alternatively, an assumption that pilots will be able managed – overreliance on human intervention in abnormal circumstances.
A problem with autobrake, as with automation in general, is that it disconnects the pilot from the feel of the aircraft. Pilots lack knowledge of applied foot-force vs deceleration, and from that, varying decelerations on runways with different braking conditions. This is accentuated with the use of reverse.
“Use of the autobrake system is recommended whenever the runway is limited …”; what is limited?
Before stating the classic certification rules, how might a pilot judge this, what information is available in the QRH, what is taught, and does this result in a consistent answer?
As a predominantly non-autobrake user (most types did not have it), why do Boeing come to their recommendation; what are the problems in the various conditions. Historically the case was made on inconsistent human performance during an RTO – a rare occurrence with less safety margin than for most operations.
Perhaps Boeing now judges that automation can better human performance in more normal instances. Yet an operational interpretation of their ‘recommendation’ often opposes the Boeing philosophy that the crew can (will) always override. The expectancy is that crews will be able judge ‘when’ to intervene, but the recommendation reduces opportunity to gain those skills required to judge, particularly in the more abnormal conditions.
Has the balance between comfort, cost, runway occupancy vs safety swung too far? On the basis of overrun statistics arguably yes, – ‘safety first’; have we really thought about it.
Autobrake = automind; think about it, what does ‘use’ mean, assume, or imply - pilots, trainers, operators, regulators, and manufactures.