@Bpalmer:
I think we're looking into technical specifics a little deeply there in terms of the discussion we were having on training.
Reading between the lines, I think when the report is saying "Stall phenomena are covered during the initial A320 type rating", the important word is "phenomena". This covers a few areas, but I think the clue is in the following context - namely "(Stall warning / buffet onset)"
The second paragraph in full said (sorry for repost, but we're across the default page boundary):
At the time of the accident, the immediate actions were: simultaneously reducing angle of attack and applying TOGA thrust from the first signs of the stall (Stall warning / buffet onset). A minimal loss of altitude was expected.
This is an "approach to stall" action set, not that of recovery from a fully-developed stall, and the key phrase is "A minimal loss of altitude was expected". This refers implicitly to the industry's change of focus from stall recovery to avoidance, because recovery from a developed stall necessitates an appreciable loss of altitude.
Regarding your technical point, while the low-speed stability soft protection was not available in Alternate 2B - I think the pitch attitude readout from the DFDR implies that the airframe has a natural tendency to pitch nose-down as the speed drops off regardless of any extra impetus from the flight control system. Of course, a manual nose-down input will enhance that tendency and make a recovery happen more swiftly, but the FCOM (
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...nexe.11.en.pdf) at the time seemed to cover this with the instruction "PITCH ATTITUDE...REDUCE".