PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - School children caught up in Qantas plane weight drama Part 2
Old 8th Sep 2014, 14:04
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framer
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
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so reject at rotate = off the end of the runway and likely death/fire/paperwork etc.
Sometimes yes, sometimes no.
I fly the 737 and sometimes with a long runway using the Boeing OPT you could stop from VR with a kilometre to spare.
V1 and VR are often within one or two knots of each other in the NG.
This from a 737 RTO report;
. At VR, the copilot applied normal rotation force on the control column. “He doubled his effort after his first attempt had no effect,” the report said. “The captain was aware that there was no rotation and decided to stop the aircraft.”
Airspeed was 155 kt when the pilots brought the throttles to idle and proceeded with the re- jected takeoff procedure. “The speed was under control with 900 m [2,953 ft] of runway remain- ing, which allowed braking to be reduced, and the aircraft vacated the runway at the upwind end,” the report said.
So how different is that from the situation we are discussing? I think it is fairly similar and can think of two more where the RTO was initiated after VR because the nose was very heavy and the Captain determined that the aircraft was "unsafe to fly".

Unsure of aircraft type for this one;
During a takeoff from Frankfurt airport, just before reaching V2 there was a loud bang followed by severe vibration. The Captain concluded that the aircraft was not safe to fly and rejected the takeoff. The aircraft stopped in the remaining runway available. The vibrations were caused by a tire failure.
This one is also 737;
The takeoff was rejected after the decision speed V1 and while the nose wheel was off the ground for approximately two seconds. The aircraft stopped with 500m to spare.
There are plenty more. The takeoff safety training aid points out that of the 74 RTO overruns studied from the western built jet transport fleet, the RTO was initiated after V1 58% of the time. The problem I see with getting false load data is that the problem is often hidden until the high speed regime where the flight crew have to make a decision very quickly with incomplete information.
I don't think it is an area where we can accept declining standards and cross our fingers.
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