With acknowledgements to Flight Global Archive
FROM ALL QUARTERS . . .
The Scimitar Accident
DURING and after last week's Gosport inquest on Cdr. J. D.
Russell, R.N., former CO. of No. 803 Sqn., who lost his
life when his Scimitar went over the side of H.M.S. Victorious in
the Channel on September 25, some details were given of the
sequence of events which led to his death. The squadron was
coming aboard the new carrier and Cdr. Russell had made a series
of normal "touch-and-go" approaches preparatory to making the
first arrested landing. In this he made a normal touch-down and
caught the first arrester wire; but, when the aircraft had almost
stopped, the wire snapped and the aircraft rolled very slowly
forward and toppled off the end of the angled deck into the sea.
It remained afloat for a surprisingly long time and Cdr. Russell
was seen to be operating various controls and removing his headgear
while an airman was lowered towards the aircraft from the
plane-guard helicopter. The cockpit canopy momentarily opened
and then slid shut again just before the aircraft sank out of sight
with the pilot still on board. During a subsequent search of the
area no trace of him could be found. Intensive salvage operations,
frequently hampered by strong tides and bad weather, resulted in
the recovery of the forward portion of the aircraft about a month
later, together with the pilot's body.
Press photographers aboard Victorious at the time of the accident
took pictures and film which were widely publicized in
newspapers and on television. Mainly because of this, and of the
puzzling failure of the pilot to leave his aircraft, the accident has
attracted considerable attention.
From the evidence given at the inquest, and from facts made
known by the Admiralty, the sequence of events is now fairly well
established. It is clear that Cdr. Russell's death was the result of
a combination of circumstances, each of which contributed towards
final disaster. Firstly, the arrester wire broke because a small valve
in the hydraulic decelerator gear was left open and this was not
detected during normal testing of the system. (The traditional
test procedure of pulling the wire out with a tractor is now to be
changed.) When the wire broke the aircraft had almost stopped,
but no attempt was apparently made to stop it finally or to steer
it away from the edge of the deck. The pilot could almost
certainly have braked to a standstill had he realized what was
happening, but his attention was probably occupied by the checks
which have to be carried out very quickly at that juncture.
The aircraft having settled in the water close alongside the
carrier, and with the helicopter on the spot, the pilot's chances of
a successful escape by climbing out into the water seemed
excellent. All he had to do, in theory, was to get rid of the canopy,
either explosively or manually, undo the quick-release box on his
combined parachute/seat harness to detach himself from seat and
parachute, remove his helmet and his dinghy-pack attachments,
and unfasten the leg-restraint quick-release buckles.
In the event, it has been established that he was unable to pull
the canopy-jettison handle because it became fouled. (The handle
has already been redesigned.) The alternative in such cases is to
use the ejection seat, but this Cdr. Russell certainly did not
attempt at any stage. It may be that he felt he had precluded
this by undoing his harness, possibly in order to get closer to the
lever, or that he still considered that ejection was unnecessary. He
may also have thought that the helicopter was too close overhead
to permit ejection. In fact, he continued to try to open the canopy
by sliding it back manually; but this would have been difficult,
because the weight of the canopy tends to close it when the nose
of the aircraft is down. He was seen to slide it some way back, but
it slid closed again.
By this time water must have been entering the cockpit through
the inward-relief system which is specifically intended to admit
water to balance internal and external pressures and make under-
reaching his mask through the supply tube; therefore, when the
water level reached the regulator, water would flow to his mask
and force him to spend time in removing his headgear. This he
was seen to do. A regulator setting for breathing 100 per cent
oxygen would have excluded water from the system and increased
his endurance, but it seems likely that his energies had been very
considerably taxed by the struggle with canopy and headgear by
the time the aircraft finally sank. He very probably did manage to
open the canopy manually underwater (though it might have slid
back after a change of aircraft attitude) but he did not release his
leg-restraint straps. He remained held in the cockpit, though not
necessarily by the leg-restraint gear.
On the Martin-Baker Mk 4 ejection seat fitted in the Scimitar
the leg-restraint straps pass from the shear rivets on the floor,
through snubber boxes, through D-rings on the pilot's garters and
to attachments on the seat-pan which are unlocked either by the
automatic sequence of ejection or by the manual operation of the
override lever. This also unfastens the harness from the seat.
After landing normally or ditching, the pilot leaves the seat by
undoing the combined parachute/seat harness and detaching the
D-rings on his garters by spring-loaded quick-releases. These
were found to be in full working order after salvage, and it
seems certain that Cdr. Russell did not reach the stage of undoing
them. He had almost certainly spent much time and energy in
overcoming earlier difficulties.
The Admiralty has stated definitely that in this accident, and in
a subsequent unsuccessful ejection from a Scimitar near Lossiemouth
(see "R.N. Scimitars Cleared," p. 925), no fault was found in the Martin-Baker ejection seats.