Originally Posted by
roulishollandais
Underestimating the risk to deepstall that plane or the risk to be unable to recover from the stall ?
If you'll excuse the Google translation of the original HMC PDF:
Originally Posted by HM-C
Airbus and EASA have asked drivers to take responsibility for default equipment of the A 330 underestimating risk.
For one thing, the Thales AA probes were *not* a default fit, they were an option.
For another, there's an interesting sideline here:
Pitot probes : Air France - Corporate
Following the fluctuations and/or inconsistency in aerodynamic speed indications on the long-haul A330 and A340 reported by some airlines, the French Civil Aviation Authorities published an Airworthiness Directive (AD) per type of aircraft to impose the replacement of the ROSEMOUNT P/N 0851GR Pitot probes, either with the GOODRICH P/N 0851HL probes, or by the SEXTANT (THALES) P/N C16195-AA probes. This operation had to be completed by 31 December 2003.
Even more interesting:
The authorities did in fact attribute these incidents to the presence of ice crystals and/or quantities of water which exceeded the specifications of the P/N 0851GR Pitot probes, manufactured by ROSEMOUNT, which was acquired in 1993 by GOODRICH.
So in effect, the Goodrich probes which were recommended to replace the Thales probes after the accident were in fact a development of the original Rosemount probes which were also known to be problematic.
As for the overriding premise of M. Marnet-Cornus's PDF, it's the standard SNPL modus operandi of indignant tone, selective presentation of information and questionable attempts at misdirection.
(again please excuse Google Translate)
..the Autopilot and auto-thrust are disconnected, flight controls move ALTERNATE into law.
While control of the aircraft is reduced, the crew must keep them in a very small area of flight and face a incredible number of alarms in a very short time. This is an excessive workload.
The ALTERNATE, which was imposed their law and using which they had never been trained at high altitude, is a mode degraded flight controls. The A 330 was no longer consistent with all regulations of the basis of his certification, he was just "Controllable" very unstable in roll. The loss of information speed entailed the risk of asking its flight.
The second paragraph is incorrect - in fact the likelihood is that the aircraft would have stayed more-or-less on course had the crew done absolutely nothing with the controls in response to AP disconnect.
The third paragraph makes reference to a claim that Alternate Law makes the aircraft unstable in roll. Again, this is a fabrication. Alternate 2 makes roll control direct - so the aircraft will be *more sensitive* in roll, but that's a long way from unstable.
In the space of 49 seconds, to 02h10.54, the A 330 wins and can not be recovered
He uses this phraseology a few times - implying that the aircraft's systems forced themselves into an uncontrollable state from which the pilots could not recover. This completely ignores the fact that it was the PF's control inputs that put the aircraft into that situation in the first place.
For over four years, the media relentlessly dogs custody of the politico-industrial system cowardly tried to make dead drivers solely responsible for this tragedy
Yet another fabrication. The BEA report implicitly criticises the airline, the regulator, the manufacturer and the system as a whole.
All these points of very questionable veracity occur in the introduction, three pages in. I have a very difficult time believing that the rest of the document is much better in that regard.